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ABSTRACT
Li, Jianfu. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. The Tessera D&R Computa-
tional Environment: Designed Experiments for R-Hadoop Performance and Bitcoin
Analysis. Major Professor: William S. Cleveland.
D&R is a statistical framework for the analysis of large complex data that enables
feasible and practical analysis of large complex data. The analyst selects a division
method to divide the data into subsets, applies an analytic method of the analysis to
each subset independently with no communication among subsets, selects a recombi-
nation method that is applied to the outputs across subsets to form a result of the
analytic method for the entire data. The computational tasking of D&R is nearly em-
barrassingly parallel, so D&R can readily exploit distributed, parallel computational
environments, such as our D&R computational environment, Tessera.
In the first part of this dissertation, I present a study of the performance of the
Tessera D&R computational environment through designed experiments.
The base of the D&R computational environment is RHIPE, the R and Hadoop
Integrated Programming Environment. R is a widely used interactive language for
data analysis. Hadoop is a distributed, parallel computational environment consisting
of a distributed file system (HDFS) and distributed compute engine (MapReduce).
RHIPE is a merger of R and Hadoop.
The D&R framework enables a fast embarrassingly parallel computation on a
cluster for large complex data that can lead to a small computational elapsed times
for the applications analytic methods to all of the data. However, the time depends
on many factors. The system we study is very complex and the effects of factors are
complex. There are interactions, but not well understood. So we run a full factorial
experiment with replicates to enable an understanding.
xiii
In the second part of this dissertation, I present an analysis of the Bitcoin trans-
action data utilizing the Tessera D&R computational environment.
Bitcoin is a de-centralized digital currency system. There is no central authority
in the Bitcoin system to issue new money, or validate the transfer of money; both
of these tasks are accomplished through the joint work of participants in the Bitcoin
network. In the past two years, the Bitcoin system has become very popular, mostly
due to its ease of use and embedded anonymity in the system.
The ease of use of Bitcoin is straightforward. The anonymity of the Bitcoin
system, on the other hand, is rather debatable and has drawn much attention in its
user community as well as the research community. We admit that a certain level
of anonymity exists in the Bitcoin system, but it might not be as invulnerable as
one would hope. For one thing, the entire history of Bitcoin transactions is publicly
available, which provides an opportunity for passive analysis of Bitcoin usage such as
ours.
I present here a study of the general statistical properties of the usage of Bitcoin
transactions and the usage of Bitcoin addresses. We have also built profiles for a
few groups of popular addresses among which the addresses share similar behavior.
Furthermore, we provide a passive analysis of the anonymity of Bitcoin system by
proposing a classification model to identify payment and change in majority of the
Bitcoin transactions.
11. A MULTI-FACTOR DESIGNED EXPERIMENT FOR
PERFORMANCE OF THE TESSERA D&R COMPUTATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT FOR LARGE COMPLEX DATA
1.1 Divide and Recombine (D&R) for Large Complex Data
1.1.1 D&R Statistical Framework
D&R [1] [2] is a statistical framework for the analysis of large complex data that
enables feasible and practical analysis of large complex data. The analyst selects a
division method to divide the data into subsets, applies an analytic method of the
analysis to each subset independently with no communication among subsets, selects
a recombination method that is applied to the outputs across subsets to form a result
of the analytic method for the entire data.
Analytic methods have two distinct categories, visualization methods whose out-
puts are visual displays, and number-category methods whose outputs are numeric
and categorical values. In D&R, number-category analytic methods are typically
applied to each of the subsets. Visualization methods are typically applied to each
subset in a sample of subsets because often there are too many of them to look at
plots of all [3]. The D&R result for an analytic method is almost always not the same
as the result that would have occurred had it been feasible and practical to apply
the method directly to all of the data. D&R research in statistical theory consists of
developing division methods and recombination methods to maximize the statistical
accuracy of the D&R result. Optimal choices can result in a statistical accuracy that
is close to that of the direct all-data application of the method, were it feasible and
practical. Statistically there are D&R efforts going on under different names, e.g.,
“Consensus” has been used for recombine [4].
2The D&R statistical framework leads to simple, feasible, and practical computa-
tion on a cluster for the analysis of large complex data. The reason is that much
of the computational tasking of D&R is nearly embarrassingly parallel, that is, no
communication between the parallel processing, which is the simplest parallel pro-
cessing. D&R can readily exploit computational environments that run on clusters,
such as Hadoop [5] and Spark [6] [7], which enable distributing subsets across the
cluster, and carrying out the parallel processing across the cluster. This also means
the cluster nodes are both data nodes and compute nodes. Furthermore, for each
analytic method, even iterative ones, the data in the form of subsets are read into
memory only once.
1.1.2 Tessera Computational Environment
Tessera [8] is a computational environment to carry out D&R. The front end of
Tessera, what the data analyst uses to program with the data, is R [9], the widely
used and highly acclaimed interactive language for data analysis. The back end is the
Hadoop distributed, parallel computational environment [5] consisting of a distributed
file system (HDFS) [10] and distributed compute engine (MapReduce) [11]. RHIPE
[12], the R and Hadoop Integrated Programming Environment, is a merger of R and
Hadoop. The analyst carries out all analysis within R, using RHIPE R commands
to communicate with Hadoop. This protects the analyst from having to manage the
details of the Hadoop database management and parallel processing.
The analyst specifies R code for the three D&R tasks:
• divide the into subsets (D[dr] computations)
• apply the analytic method to each subset (A[dr] computations)
• recombine the outputs of the A computations and write results to the HDFS
((R[dr] computations).
3In each case the analyst passes the R code to RHIPE R commands that manage the
communication between R and Hadoop, and Hadoop carries out the R computations
on the cluster nodes. A large part of these computations are embarrassingly paral-
lel, which means no communication between the parallel computations, the simplest
possible parallel processing.
Hadoop computes the subsets by executing the analyst D[dr] R commands, and
distributes the subsets across the servers of the cluster into the Hadoop Distributed
File System (HDFS). Hadoop runs the analyst A[dr] R commands on the subsets
across the server cores using its Map computational procedure. Map is an embarrass-
ingly parallel procedure, not allowing communication among the subset computations.
Hadoop schedules these computations by assigning a core to a data block, or a col-
lection of subsets. There are typically far more subsets than cores. As each subset
computation ends, another collection of subsets is chosen and a core assigned to it.
Hadoop attempts to optimize by assigning a core as close as possible to the subsets
location, for example, on the same node as the subsets if possible. Hadoop runs
the analyst R[dr] R commands on the outputs of the A[dr] computations using the
Reduce computational procedure, which can compute across subsets. Aspects of the
computation can be embarrassingly parallel. The D[dr] R commands can use both
Map and Reduce, and much of this computation can be embarrassingly parallel.
1.1.3 Designed Experiments to Improve Performance of D&R Compu-
tations on a Cluster
The D&R framework enables a fast embarrassingly parallel computation on a
cluster for large complex data that can lead to a small computational executions times
for the applications of analytic methods to all of the data. However, the time depends
on many factors. This presents an opportunity for optimizing the computation even
further by making the best choice of the factors. Our approach to the optimization
is to run statistically designed experiments. We report here on one such experiment.
4The system we study is very complex and the effects of factors are complex. There
are interactions, but not well understood. So we run a full factorial experiment with
replicates to enable an understanding. Hadoop and the hardware architecture factors
are a major part of the experimentation. There have been investigations of perfor-
mance of these factors that are meant to lead to “best practices”, such as [13] [14]
and [15]; there have also been studies of Hadoop performance via simulation ap-
proach [16] [17], as well as through profiling and modelling [18] [19]; some studies
also conducted experiments and benchmarking to explore optimal configuration set-
tings and to seek improvements for Hadoop, such as [20] and [21]. However, we have
not found comprehensive multi-factor experiments with a statistical design that can
convincingly account for the effects of the factors including interactions.
1.2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, the analytic method is logistic regression. It is applied to
each subset by the R function glm.fit. Elapsed time associated with this is the
response. Quantitative results that guide optimization come from building and fitting
a model that relates the response to the factors. In all runs of the experiment there
are N = 230 observations of V variables. One variable is the dependent variable ,
randomly generated 0’s and 1’s in which the probability of a 1 is 0.5. The remaining
are V − 1 explanatory variables, each a randomly generated normal with mean 0 and
variance 1.
The data are generated, and written to the HDFS by a D[dr] computation. How-
ever, this computation is not part of the experiment. Rather, the total execution time
is for the A[dr] and D[dr] computations together. The reason is that in a D&R anal-
ysis, a division resulting from a D&R division persists and is used for many analytic
methods. The D[dr] computational cost is amortized across the analytic methods.
This is a good thing because the D[dr] computation is often quite big. The recombi-
nation method in our experiment is to take the means of the subset estimates of the
5coefficients; they are then written to the HDFS. This R[dr] computation is negligible
compared with A[dr].
1.2.1 Factors, Replication, and Error Term Variability
There are 2 types of execution time that will be described shortly. Their sum is
the total execution time. So this means that there is one computation-type categorical
factor in the experiment with 2 levels. There are 2 statistical factors that measure
characteristics of the dataset and the subsets. These factors also affect the statistical
properties of the D&R estimates of the regression coefficients. One is the number
of observations per subset. There are two HDFS factors that control aspects of the
HDFS. One is the I/O buffer size. There are two Hadoop MapReduce factors. One
is the maximum number of Map tasks allowed. There are two hardware factors,
which are aspects of the cluster hardware architecture. One is the speed of the
network connecting the nodes. Altogether there are 9 factors in the experiment. One
statistical factor has 5 levels, the other statistical factor has 3, and the remaining
factors each have 2.
Knowledge of functioning of the computational environment provides information
that helps greatly in choosing the factors and their levels. However, that knowledge
does not provide strong insight into interactions. We must rely on empirical study
for this. The reason is simply that while there has been some study of Hadoop
performance one factor at time, we have been unable to find results on interactions. So
we must rely on the empirical study of the experimental data to discover interactions,
and a some of our knowledge of the functioning. For this reason the design is a full
factorial. So there are 1920 combinations of the factors. There are 3 replicates for of
each combination, so there are 5760 runs of the experiment.
Each run has full use of the cluster without other users and without other runs.
However, there are known sources of variation that we cannot readily control, and
leave as error variability. One source is from system processes that use a variable
6amount of capacity on the cluster. We do not expect this to be large in magnitude
compared with the effects of the controlled experimental factors of the experiment.
Another source is the iterative fitting of glm.fit for each subset. The number of
iterations is determined by a convergence criterion. The number varies, which means
the execution times of individual fits vary. We could have fixed the number to a
constant, but did not to maintain as much verisimilitude as possible. We do record
the number of iterations. However, as we will see, the error variability is quite small
compared with the effects of the factors. Part of the model building includes careful
study of the variability.
1.2.2 Measurements and the Computation-Type Factor
There are two types of execution-time computation. The subsets are stored on
the HDFS as R objects. The first computation type is O, the execution time to read
the subsets from the HDFS and make them available to glm.fit in memory as an R
objects. So O is a part of the A[dr] computation. The other type, L, starts when O
ends. It consists of glm.fit computations on the subsets using Hadoop Map, plus
gathering the subset estimates and computing the means using Hadoop Reduce. L is
part of the A[dr] computation plus the R[dr] computation.
There are two types of execution-time measurements but they are not (O,L).
The reason is that we cannot measure L directly by just running glm.fit. It needs
data. So for each combination of all other factors, we measure O in one run and
T = O+L in another. We get O by doing just the reading into memory and forming
the R object in memory. That is, we do not run glm.fit. We get T by running
everything, reading and forming the object, applying glm.fit, and carrying out the
recombination. There are 960 combinations of the factors other than computation
type. With 3 replicates for combination, there are 2880 runs of measuring O runs.
Similarly, there are 2880 T runs.
7As part of our initial modeling, we hypothesize that for the measurement T =
O+L, O (abusing notation here somewhat) has the same execution time distribution
as O in the direct measurement. We check this in the model building as well as argue
for it based on how we define O and L. Since we do not measure L directly, it is in
effect a latent variable. To get the properties of L, we carry out a statistical model
building approach that serves as a deconvolution method.
1.2.3 Statistical Factors
The number of observations of the variables, response and explanatory, is held
constant to N = 230, so it is not a factor. There are two statistical factors. One is
V , the number of variables. The second is M , the number of observations per subset,
where N/M = R is an integer, the number of subsets. The experimental values of M
and V are shown in Table 1.1. For each V = V0, we randomly generated one dataset,
Table 1.1.: Statistical factors.
Factor Values Description
V 24, 25, 26 Number of variables
M 216,214,· · · ,28 Number of observations per subset
response and explanatory variables, resulting in NV0 values. This dataset is used in
all runs with V = V0.
There are three other variables derived from the values of N , M , and V that are
important to our analysis. The first, R, is defined above. The next two, S and D, are
sizes in memory, measured in bytes. Each value of the V variables in the experiment
is stored in memory as double precision, which is 8 bytes. S = 8MV bytes is the size
of each subset. It changes across runs with M and V . D = 8NV bytes is the total
size of the dataset. It changes with V across runs. The values of R, S, and D taken
in the experiment are shown in Table 1.2. s varies from 32 kilobytes to 32 megabytes.
8S varies from 128 gigabytes to 0.5 terabytes. R varies from about 16,000 to about
4,000,000.
Table 1.2.: Derived statistical variables used in the analysis.
Factor Values Description
R 214, 215, · · · , 222 Number of subsets.
S 215, 216, · · · , 225 Size of subset in bytes.
D 237, 238, · · · , 239 Size of dataset in bytes.
1.2.4 Hadoop HDFS Factors
Subsets in the experiment are put into blocks by the HDFS and stored as inde-
pendent units. The size of a block, BLK, is a HDFS configuration parameter, and
affects not only the storage of the dataset but also MapReduce scheduling of tasks.
When a dataset is used as input to a MapReduce job, the Hadoop scheduler assigns a
Map task to each block. So there are as many Map tasks as the number of blocks the
dataset spans. Therefore, S, the size of the dataset, and BLK, the size of a block,
determine the number of Map tasks. Given S, the smaller BLK and the larger the
number of blocks, so consequently, the larger the number of Map tasks. Each Map
task works with a lesser amount of data and in general this leads to better paralleliza-
tion. However, more tasks increase the management workload for the NameNode and
the JobTracker.
Another factor that has been shown to affect HDFS I/O performance is the
Hadoop I/O buffer size, or IOB. Technically, IOB affects not only the HDFS, but
also other aspects of Hadoop where I/O operations are present. IOB determines how
much data is buffered in I/O pipes before transferring to other operations during read
and write operations. Its default in our version of Hadoop is 4 kilobytes. This is a
conservative setting. 64 kilobytes has been suggested as a good choice [15].
9Table 1.3.: HDFS Factors.
Factor Values Description
BLK 128, 256 HDFS block size in megabytes.
IOB 4, 64 Hadoop I/O buffer size in kilobytes.
1.2.5 Hadoop MapReduce Factors
The Map task capacity, or MTC, controls the maximum number of Map tasks
that can be run simultaneously on a given node. Of course, this is bounded by the
number of cores on the node. Collectively on the experimental cluster which has the
same number c of cores per node, the maximum that can be run is c timesMTC. One
might think a larger MTC should always be preferred over a smaller one. However,
there is a limit on the the node hardware resources: core, memory, disk, and network.
So too many tasks create bottlenecks in any one of a number of node resources. For
Reduce tasks, there is a corresponding factor, RTC. We do not take this as a factor
because the reduce execution time in this experiment is negligible. Table 1.4 gives
the experimental values of MTC.
Map and Reduce tasks are each run on its own Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to
isolate it from other running tasks. The overhead of starting new JVMs for all tasks
can be significant in certain circumstances. However, MapReduce jobs that have a
large number of very short-lived tasks can see performance gains when a JVM is
reused for subsequent tasks. The maximum number of tasks to run for a given job for
each JVM launched, REUSE, is a MapReduce configuration parameter. A values of
1 means JVM reuse is disabled. A value of -1 indicates no limit, so the same JVM
may be used for as many tasks as possible. Table 1.4 shows the values of this factor.
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Table 1.4.: MapReduce Factors.
Factor Values Description
MTC 12, 16 Map task capacity.
REUSE True, False Task JVM reuse.
1.2.6 Hardware Factors
The experiment was run on a cluster configured and maintained by system ad-
ministrators for the Department of Statistics Purdue University. It consists of 6 Dell
R515 nodes interconnected by 10 gigabit Ethernet. Collectively, the cluster has 96
cores, 384 gigabytes of RAM, and 144 terabytes of disk. Each node has dual 3.0
GHz 8-core AMD Opteron(tm) 4284 processors (16 cores); 64 GB RAM; and 12 2TB
7200 RPM nearline SAS (NL-SAS) physical disks. The cluster runs Cloudera Hadoop
0.20.2-cdh3u5; protobuf-2.4.1 protocol buffer software; RHIPE 0.73.1; R 2.15.1; and
Java 1.7.0.07-b10.
There are two hardware factors, the number of physical disks per node and the
speed of the node interactions. Normal operation of the cluster is described above. To
change the 10 gigabit/sec speed to 1 gigabit/sec requires changing Ethernet cards in
the nodes. To change the number of disks per node from 12 to 6 requires disconnects
physical drives and redistributing the test data across the HDFS.
Table 1.5.: Hardware Factors.
Factor Values Description
DISK 12, 6 Number of disks per node.
NETWORK 10, 1 Network bandwidth in gigabits/sec.
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1.3 The Model Building Strategy
Model building is the critical task in the statistical analysis of the experimen-
tal data. Once the model is identified, validated, and fitted, results come readily,
although as we shall see they are complex, and need trellis display to be able to
understand them.
In this section we describe the approach to model building we take to meet certain
challenges in the process. The principal challenge is that we want to model the effects
of factors on O and L, but we measure O and T = O + L. We do not measure L
directly. We need a strategy of model building that includes a deconvolution method
to provide surrogate data for L to guide its modeling.
1.3.1 The Model Core: Dependence on M and V
The two factors M and V have a special role in our investigation. They are
the statistical part. Their values in practice are chosen by the data analyst based
on both statistical considerations and computational considerations. The statistical
accuracy of D&R results depend on them, and so does the computational efficiency.
The analyst has to balance the two considerations in practice. The other 6 factors
in the experiment — BLK, IOB, MTC, REUSE, DISK, and NETWORK — involve
the computational system, hardware factors and Hadoop configuration. We expect
interactions of some of them with M and V . We have a good bit of broad knowledge
about the dependence of O and L on M and V based on Hadoop computational
considerations and the nature of the computational tasking of O and L.
As V increases, the size of the dataset increases proportionally. So for other factors
held fixed, this certainly means monotone increases in O and L with increases in V .
O is mostly the task of reading all of the data into memory. As shown in Section 1.2,
the size is D = 8NV ; the values it takes are shown in Table 1.2 are 128, 256, and 512
gigabytes. We would expect O to increase proportionally with V for other factors
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held fixed, or not be too far off. Because D does not change with M , we expect a
small effect of M for other factors held fixed.
As M increases with other factors held fixed, we expect that L will first decrease
and then increase. This is due to two expected behaviors due to the design of Hadoop.
AsM increases from the the smallest values, ongoing Map computations at any given
moment are asking for more memory, which can cause bottlenecks; this tends of make
L increase with asM increases. But asM decreases from the largest values, the num-
ber of subsets R increases, the number of Map tasks goes up, and task management
costs increase. this tends of make L as M decreases. These two phenomena act
against one another, effects can be extreme for both large and smallM . So we expect
L to first decrease and then increase with M .
1.3.2 Experimental Values of O and T as Functions of M and V
We denote the experimental values of M and V for a specific one of the 26 com-
binations of the other factors by
Mi, i = 1, . . . , 5 and Vj, j = 1, . . . , 3.
Their logs base 2 are, respectively, mi and vj. Letting k index the replicates, we
denote the execution time response variables by
Tijk Lijk and Oijk, i = 1, . . . 9, j = 1, . . . , 3, k = 1, . . . , 3.
The log base 2 of these variables are, respectively, tijk, ℓijk and oijk. Note we do
not show dependence on the values of the other 6 factors for reasons to be discussed
shortly. For each combination of the 6 factors and for each measurement type, T or
O, there are 5× 3× 3 = 45 measurements.
Each of the coming 4 plots has the following:
• 64 panels, one for each combination of the 6 Hadoop-hardware factors
• 4 pages, 16 panels per page
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• on each panel t, o is plotted against m or v
• when the plot is against m, values of v are shown by plotting character, and a
loess curve is fitted to t or o on m
• when the plot is against v, values of m are shown by plotting character, and
connecting the the means of 3 log execution time replicates with lines
Figure 1.1 plots o against m, with different values of v superposed, conditioning
on Hadoop-hardware factors. The strip labels of the panels describe the level of
the Hadoop-hardware factors, and the factors are varying from fastest to slowest in
the following order: IOB, NETWORK, MTC, DISK, BLK, REUSE. Pairs of panels
when one factor is varying while others are held constant are separated vertically,
horizontally, or by page, to make the comparison more effective. In most of panels,
the loess curve of o on m is close to a flat line, and o does not seem to be varying
much with the increase of m, although there are some panels where a slight increasing
pattern is present for larger value of v. The relationship between o and m appears
to be linear and the dependence is generally quite weak. On the other hand, as
suggested by the clear separation of points and loess curves of different colors, o
varies significantly with v, more specifically, it is monotone increasing with v in all
panels. As we move across panels, the effects of Hadoop-hardware factors on o and
their interactions withm come into play, and the values of o, as well as its relationship
with m, vary from panel to panel to different degrees, depending on which factor(s)
are varied.
Link to figure
Figure 1.1.: o is plotted againstm superpose v, conditioning on Hadoop-hardware
factors.
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Figure 1.2 plots o against v, with different values of m superposed, conditioning
on Hadoop-hardware factors. The relationship between o and v becomes more clear:
o is increasing with v, and the increase is not always linear as the amount of increase
in o from v = 4 to v = 5 can differ from the increase from v = 5 to v = 6 depending
on the combination of Hadoop-hardware factors. Particularly, the increase in o with
a unit increase of v is not exactly 1, meaning it does not take exactly twice as much
time when the data size is doubled. Also there is a fair bit of overlapping for different
values of m in the figure, and this is because of the weak dependence of o on m given
the value of v we have already identified from the above figure.
Link to figure
Figure 1.2.: o is plotted against v superposem, conditioning on Hadoop-hardware
factors.
Figure 1.3 plots t against m, with different values of v superposed, conditioning
on Hadoop-hardware factors. With the aid of the loess curves, it is easy to see that
there is a non-linear relationship between t and m. And besides the difference in the
values of t, the shape of the non-linear relationship between t and m also varies with
the value of v, for example, the minima is achieved at a different value of m for each
value of v. However, the shape of the curves seems to be generally preserved across
panels for each value of v, despite the increase in the values of t with v, this will be
further investigated with other displays.
Link to figure
Figure 1.3.: t is plotted againstm superpose v, conditioning on Hadoop-hardware
factors.
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Figure 1.4 plots t against v, with different values of m superposed, conditioning
on Hadoop-hardware factors. Similar to o, t is also increasing with v, and the increase
is generally not linear, with the amount of increase in t from v = 4 to v = 5 being no
larger than the increase from v = 5 to v = 6.
Link to figure
Figure 1.4.: t is plotted against v superposem, conditioning on Hadoop-hardware
factors.
1.3.3 Interactions and A General Model Specification to Account for
Them
One property of the dependence of o and t on m and v is that there is more com-
plexity in the t patterns than the o. The o patterns are either constant or increasing
with m, and increasing with v. The t patterns decrease and then increase with v or
m; because T = O + L, this suggests o decreases and then increase with v or m.
Another property of the dependence of o and t on m and v that is apparent in
the plots is there is an interaction between m and v, and that the nature of the
interaction changes quite substantially with the 26 combinations of the systems and
hardware factors. This means there are pervasive interactions among all factors. It
is important that we preserve them as much as possible, allowing them to enter in
the modeling. So the modeling will be liberal, allowing for substantial interactions,
then characterizing the statistical accuracy. The chief reason, as emphasized earlier,
is that little is known about interactions.
We specify a general form for the dependence of o and ℓ on m and v, and then fit
it independently for each of the 26 combinations of the systems and hardware factors.
At the end, after the fitting, we will study the interactions, judging them in light of
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both a characterization of the statistical variability, and qualitative knowledge about
factors of the experiment. However, the model form is seen as tentative which, while
quite general, needs validation with model building tools. They are based partly on
the patterns seen in the plots of t and o shown earlier.




go(mij ,vij) + 2gℓ(mij ,vij)}2ǫt;ijk . (1.2)
go and gℓ are bivariate functions. ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk are jointly independent normal with
mean 0, and variances σ21 and σ
2
2 respectively. Note that go and gℓ are linear in
the unknown parameters, but the overall form of the model is nonlinear in those
parameters.
1.3.4 Discussion of Assumptions
In Equation 1.2, the term 2(gℓ(mij ,vij)) is in effect a latent variable. However, the
parameters are identifiable because of the assumption that the dependence of O on
the factors is the same in both equations. We will verify this empirically, but is very
much aided by our definition of O. This will be discussed in more detail below.
We have 3 replicates for each of the 1920 combinations of the factors, including
the measurement type factor, so altogether there are 5760 runs, 2880 yielding O
measurements, and 2880 yielding T measurements. In Section 1.2 we have identified
two sources of error variability: the number of iterations of the logistic regression,
and system processes that use a variable amount of capacity on the cluster. They are
the basis of the error terms ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk in the model. We expect both to be small
in magnitude compared with the effects of the factors.
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1.3.5 Deconvolution, A Categorical Model, and Model Building
The lack of direct of observations of L interferes with the model building. So we
take the following approach. The first model is categorical. The values of m and v
are taken to be categorical. go and gℓ each have main effects and full interaction.
The model is very general, allowing for a very wide range of dependencies of L and
O on m and v. Now this is surely an over-specified model allowing far more than
what we would expect and what is seen in the above plots, which suggest substantial
smoothness in go and gℓ. However, we fit the categorical model, and then use the
fitted values of o and ℓ in the model building as if they are the data, to find smooth go
and gℓ that fit these cat-fit data. So this approach provides is a deconvolution method
that yields the cat-fit values of ℓ for model building.
It is vital to emphasize that a resulting smooth modeling is then subjected to
diagnostic checking, not just by how well it fitted the cat-fit data, but on its own,
studying its fit to the data based on study of residuals corresponding to the error terms
ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk in the model. Given that the data for each of the 2
6 combinations have
45 observations, we might question whether there is enough information to support
reliable results. As we will see, the residuals are quite small in magnitude compared
with the magnitude of most of the effects of the factors of the model. Uncertainty of
whether observed effects are valid occurs only for those quite small in magnitude; we
will use the bootstrap to help just these cases.
1.4 Identifying A Tentative Polynomial Model From the Categorical
We fitted the categorical model to the data for each of the 26 combinations of the
systems and hardware factors, and then carried out model diagnostics to detect lack of
fit if it exists by plotting residuals, and check for normally distributed errors, ǫo;ijk and
ǫt;ijk. In the interest of space we do not report details of this, just conclusions, because
the we describe model checking details for the model arising from this categorical
fitting which is the model to be used to characterize the effects of the factors on o
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and ℓ. This is the model checking that determines the adequacy of the assumptions
for the model used to make inferences about the dependence of o and ℓ on the factors.
We found no lack of fit of the categorical model that was more than very minor.
This is not surprising because the number of observations for each combination is 90,
and the number of parameters to fit the data is 30. We checked the assumption of
normality of the errors, ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk, by normal quantile plots of the residuals, one
per combination. We found the empirical distributed to be well approximated by the
normal, a very welcome finding.
Figure 1.5 plots the o cat-fit values against m. The general layout is like that of
the plots in Section 1.3 with one panel for each of the 64 combinations of the Hadoop-
hardware factors. Each panel has the values of v encoded by color as shown in the
key. The change in o as a function of m is clearly small compared with that of v, as
expected. The dependence on m does show, in some cases consistent small changes
that also interact with the value of v; that is, there is an interaction of m and v.
Link to figure
Figure 1.5.: o cat-fits are plotted against m.
Figure 1.6 plots the o cat-fit values against v with values of m in each panel
encoded as shown in the key. The patterns are very close to linear, but show in many
cases a slight convex upward pattern, indicating that going from v = 4 to v = 5 has
less increase than from v = 5 to v = 6.
Link to figure
Figure 1.6.: o cat-fit values are plotted against v.
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To describe the dependence seen in the plots, we take as as a tentative model for
the o dependence on m and v to be
go(m, v) = µo + αo1 · v + αo2 · v
2 + βo1 ·m.
This is part of the overall model for O and L in Equations 1.1 and 1.2. In specifying
go(m, v) we provide for all observed patterns across the 2
6 combinations, which means
some specifications, such as convexity in v, are needed in some cases but not all. We
can of course prune unneeded model features for some the combinations.
Figure 1.7 plots the ℓ cat-fit values against m in the same manner as the o cat-fit
values against m above.
Link to figure
Figure 1.7.: ℓ cat-fit values are plotted against m.
There is a quadratic effect for v = 4 and v = 5 but with a suggestion of a cubic
for v = 6, because the slope drops somewhat for the last two values of v.
Figure 1.8 plots the ℓ cat-fit values against v in the same manner as the o cat-fit
values against v above.
Link to figure
Figure 1.8.: ℓ cat-fit value are are plotted against v.
There is a pronounced quadratic effect, but with a suggestion that the effect
changes with m.
To describe the dependence seen in the plots, we take as as a tentative model for
the ℓ dependence on m and v to be
gℓ(m, v) = µℓ + αℓ1 · v + αℓ2 · v
2 + βℓ1 ·m+ βℓ2 ·m
2 + γℓ · v ·m
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These polynomial models, gℓ(m, v) and go(m, v), are part of the tentative overall




go(mij ,vij) + 2gℓ(mij ,vij)}2ǫt;ijk .
We have
go(m, v) = µo + αo1 · v + αo2 · v
2 + βo1 ·m.
and
gℓ(m, v) = µℓ + αℓ1 · v + αℓ2 · v
2 + βℓ1 ·m+ βℓ2 ·m
2 + γℓ · v ·m.
In addition the two sets of mutually independent error terms, ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk, are
each taken to be i.i.d normal with variances σ2o and σ
2
t , respectively. This tentative
specification is based on the residuals for the categorical model being well approxi-
mated by the normal. This tentative model applies to each of the 64 combinations of
the Hadoop-hardware factors, has different parameter values across the combinations,
and has independent error terms across the combinations. This is done because we
need to provide empirically as much latitude as possible to see interactions. So each
combination is fitted independently, maximum likelihood.
1.5 Polynomial Model: Diagnostics and Statistical Variability
In this section we describe diagnostics to check the assumptions made in the
tentative polynomial model, and provide information about the statistical variability
of the estimates of the response surface.
1.5.1 Diagnostics
To check for lack of fit of the polynomial model, we compare o and ℓ poly-fits,
the fitted values for o and ℓ from the polynomial model, with the o and ℓ cat-fits,
the fitted values for o and ℓ from the categorical model, emphasizing that the cat-fits
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serve as surrogates for the data. The poly-cat residuals for the polynomial model are
the cat-fits minus the poly-fits. For these residuals, instead of the log base 2 scale we
have been using, we use log base e, to provide much better quantitative interpretation.
Natural logs between about ±0.25 can be interpreted as a fractional change because
log(1 + r) ≈ r. The poly-cat residuals are well within ±0.25.
We also need to check the assumption that the error terms ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk are well
approximated by the normal. We do this by studying the two sets of error residuals:
values of o minus the o poly-fits, and values of t minus the o and ℓ poly-fits.
Figure 1.9 plots o poly-cat residuals against m for each of the 26 combinations of
the Hadoop-hardware factors. The layout of the panels of the display is the same as
that for other plots against m for the combinations. Variability is mostly contained
within ±0.05 which is very small compared with effects of the factors. There are a
few values for v = 6 and m = 16 whose departures are larger, but these too remain
small, not much larger than the general variability. We have observed in Section 1.4
that the categorical fits for for v = 6 show a departure from quadratic for m = 16.
We could account for this by adding a cubic term to the model, but because of the
relative small size of the departures, and our need for parsimony in the modeling, we
do not alter the model.
Link to figure
Figure 1.9.: o poly-cat residuals for the polynomial model are plotted against m.
Figure 1.10 is the plot of ℓ poly-cat residuals against m. General variability
is somewhat greater than for o. Again we see outliers, caused by the same issue
discussed above, but occurring now at m = 14. As for o, these larger departures
are not enough larger than the general variability, and are also small compared with
magnitudes of major effects, so we take no action.
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Link to figure
Figure 1.10.: ℓ poly-cat residuals for the polynomial model are plotted against
m.
Figure 1.11 is a normal quantile plot of the o error residuals. The line on the plot
is drawn through the lower and upper quartiles. The magnitudes are overall very
small. The approximation is quite good, certainly justifying lease-squares fitting, and
sufficient for using the parametric bootstrap with a normal assumption to characterize
variability.
Link to figure
Figure 1.11.: Normal quantile plot of o error residuals for the polynomial model.
Figure 1.12 is a normal quantile plot of the t error residuals. The line on the plot is
drawn through the lower and upper quartiles. The magnitudes are overall very small.
Departures from normality are somewhat greater than for the o error residuals, but
are not great enough threaten use of least-squares or ensuing inferences based on the
parametric bootstrap.
Link to figure
Figure 1.12.: Normal quantile plot of t error residuals for the polynomial model,
The polynomial model has survived diagnostic testing. It has a few blemishes that
make it wrong, but not by an amount that will appreciably affect conclusions drawn
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from it. The error terms are quite small. Almost all O errors are contained within
±10% of the O measurements, and the T errors within ±5% of the T measurements.
1.5.2 Statistical Variability of Response Surface Estimates
For each of the 26 combinations of the Hadoop-hardware factors, we used the
bootstrap to characterize the statistical variability of the o and ℓ poly-fits: o and ℓ
fitted values of the polynomial model at the 45 values of m and v of the experiment.
We study the response surface because it carries the informative information of the
experiment, magnitudes of execution times and how they change with the factors.
There were 1000 draws for each combination. Each draw consists of 45 values of
o and 45 values of ℓ. The process begins with 45 i.i.d. draws from each of the fitted
distributions for the error terms ǫo;ijk and ǫt;ijk. The fitted distributions are normal
with mean 0 and a variance equal to the sum of squares of the error residuals of each,
divided by 45. The 45 o draws are then the sum of the o error term draws plus the o
poly-fits at the 45 values of m and v. Similarly, the 45 t draws are the 45 t error term
draws plus the sum of the o poly-fits and the ℓ poly-fits at the 45 values of m and
v. Then the polynomial model was fitted to each bootstrap sample of t and o values,
and the fit evaluated the 45 values of m and v, providing one bootstrap sample for
the 45 o poly-fits and the 45 t poly-fits. To study the variability we subtract the 45
o poly-fits and the 45 t poly-fits from the corresponding 45 values of the bootstrap
sample to get the bootstrap deviations.
Figure 1.13 plots, for each of the 26 combinations of the Hadoop-hardware factors,
the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the 45 o poly-fit bootstrap deviations. The layout
of the panels of the display is the same as that for previous plots against m for the
combinations. For these bootstrap deviations, as they are well within ±0.25, we again
use log base e for better quantitative interpretation. The bootstrap variability of the
o poly-fits is very small. Almost all of the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of bootstrap
deviations are contained within ±5% of the original o poly-fits.
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Link to figure
Figure 1.13.: 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of bootstrap deviations for o poly-fits.
Figure 1.14 plots, for each of the 26 combinations of the Hadoop-hardware factors,
the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of the 45 ℓ poly-fit bootstrap deviations. General
variability is great than that for o, but not much greater. The majority of the 0.025
and 0.975 quantiles of the bootstrap deviations are contained within ±10% of the
original ℓ poly-fits.
Link to figure
Figure 1.14.: 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of bootstrap deviations for ℓ poly-fits.
1.6 Effects and Interactions of Hadoop-hardware Factors
In this section we present our findings of the impact of the Hadoop-hardware
factors on the O computation and the L computation, including the main effects
of these factors and the interactions among these factors we have discovered in the
experiments. The impact of a particular Hadoop-hardware factor on the response
surface of o and ℓ, is quantified by the improvement, or in this case the decrease, in
the fitted values of o or ℓ from the polynomial model when varying this factor from
one level to the other level, while holding all other factors constant. We also rely
on bootstrap to characterize the statistical variability of the impact of the factors on
corresponding estimates of response surface.
We relied very heavily on trellis displays to effectively study the effects and inter-
actions of the Hadoop-hardware factors, however, in the interest of space, we will use
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the factor BLK as a demonstration. Other details are not reported here and instead
a summary of our findings is given.
1.6.1 Effects of BLK and Interactions with Other Factors
BLK is a HDFS configuration parameter that affects the storage of the dataset
on the HDFS and the scheduling of Map tasks. Given all other factors remained the
same, when BLK becomes larger, each Map task reads and computes with a larger
amount of data while the number Map tasks becomes smaller accordingly. Thus,
BLK directly impacts the I/O of the HDFS and thus we would expect it to have an
effect on o; and BLK also affects the parallelization of Map tasks, thus it could also
impact ℓ as well.
Main Effects of BLK on o
In this experiment, we have doubled BLK from 128 MB to 256 MB. Figure 1.15
plots the impact of BLK on o poly-fits against m for each of the remaining 25 com-
binations of the other Hadoop-hardware factors. The impact of BLK is represented
as the change of o poly-fits when BLK is varied from 256 MB to 128 MB, while all
other factors are held constant. A positive value on the vertical scale says the o time
is larger when BLK = 128 MB than that when BLK = 256 MB, i.e., increasing
BLK improves the o time. The layout of the panels of the display is similar to that
for previous plots against m for the combinations, however, due to the collapse of the
two levels of BLK into the representation of the difference, there are only 32 panels
across two pages.
Link to figure
Figure 1.15.: Impact of BLK on o poly-fits is plotted against m.
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To study the variability of the impact, we again used bootstrap and computed the
bootstrap deviations for the impact of BLK on o poly-fits, i.e., the difference between
the impact computed from each bootstrap sample and the impact computed from the
original fit of the polynomial model. Figure 1.16 plots, for each of the remaining 25
combinations of the other Hadoop-hardware factors, the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles
of the bootstrap deviations of the impact of BLK on o poly-fits. The layout of
the panels of the display is the same as that for the previous plot against m for
the combinations. The bootstrap variability is very small, most of 0.025 and 0.975
quantiles of bootstrap deviations are contained within around ±5% of the impact
computed from the original fit.
Link to figure
Figure 1.16.: 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of bootstrap deviations for impact of
BLK on o poly-fits.
The main effects of BLK on o are obvious, as shown in the majority of the panels
in Figure 1.15, the connected points lie above zero, meaning that o is larger when
BLK is 128 MB than that when BLK is 256 MB, i.e., when BLK is increased, the
O computations are generally faster. And the amount of improvement, when there is
any, can be up to 40%. There are a few panels where some of the points lie slightly
below 0, however, the deterioration is usually less than 10%, which is comparable to
the bootstrap variability.
The positive effects on o time by increasing BLK agree with our understanding
of how BLK functions. As BLK is doubled from 128MB to 256MB while all other
factors are held constant, the amount of data/subsets in each block/Map task is
doubled and the number of blocks/Map tasks is halved accordingly.
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First of all, with fewer number of Map tasks, there are fewer task overheads, which
are are part of the O computation, so increasing BLK would improve the o timing
in this aspect.
Furthermore, with fewer number of blocks, there are fewer subsets crossing block
boundaries, resulting in smaller amount of extra data reads due to subsets crossing
block boundaries, thus could further improving o time. Notice that the amount of
extra data reads also depends on the size of subsets, so the amount of improvement
made by increasing BLK in this aspect is likely affected by factors that determines
the size of subsets, i.e., m and v in this experiment.
Lastly, BLK affects the level of parallelization, i.e., larger number of smaller tasks
versus smaller number of larger tasks, and the effects on timing could go either way,
while the combined effect of all the above aspects turned out to be positive in this
experiment when BLK is doubled.
Interaction between BLK and m on o
The interaction between BLK and m is reflected on the slopes on the lines con-
necting the points in each panel of Figure 1.15. In some of the panels, the lines have a
slope very close to zero, suggesting that there is no or very weak interaction between
BLK and m in the O computation, and the amount of improvement in o via in-
creasing BLK is about the same across different values of m; however, under certain
combinations of other Hadoop-hardware factors, especially in the top panels on the
second page of Figure 1.15, there is a non-zero slope of the lines. In fact, the lines tend
to go up in the top panels (DISK = 12) on both pages, suggesting that the amount
of improvement via increasing BLK is larger when the subsets are larger; and they
tend to stay flat or go down very slightly in the bottom panels (DISK = 6). So there
could be a weak 2-way interaction between BLK and m, and a 3-way interactions
between BLK, m and DISK.
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The interaction between BLK andm can be attributed to their joint impact on the
extra data reads caused by subsets crossing block boundaries. As m increases while
holding other factors constant, the size of each subset increases, and thus the amount
of extra data reads due to subsets crossing block boundaries would increase. So the
amount of improvement through increasing BLK by having few subsets crossing block
boundaries should be larger when m is larger than that when m is smaller.
As for the 3-way interaction among BLK, m, and DISK, we suspect that when
DISK=6, there is too much congestion in disk reads and this has become the bot-
tleneck for the O computation, and thus suppresses the effects of BLK or m.
Interaction between BLK and v on o
The interaction between BLK and v is reflected on the vertical separation of the
lines in each panel of Figure 1.15. In most of the panels in the top rows (DISK = 12)
on both pages, the lines shift up as v increases, and the amount of improvement
through increasing BLK is larger when v is larger. This again suggests that the im-
provement is larger when the subsets are larger, and the cause of interaction between
BLK and v is similar to that between BLK and m, i.e., extra data reads due to
subsets crossing block boundaries.
In most of the panels in the bottom rows (DISK = 6), on the other hand, there is
little separation among the lines for different values of v. This can also be explained
by a 3-way interaction among BLK, v, and DISK similar to the one above among
BLK, m, and DISK.
Interactions between BLK and Other Hadoop-hardware Factors on o
The interactions between BLK and the other Hadoop-hardware factors can be
visually assessed by comparing pairs of panels in Figure 1.15, either horizontally,
vertically, or across pages.
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For example, by comparing every horizontally adjacent pair of panels in the same
row, we can assess the interaction between BLK and IOB. Except for the top
left pair of panels on the first page of Figure 1.15, there does not seem to be much
visual difference between the pairs of panels when varying IOB, thus suggesting no
interaction between BLK and IOB. In fact, although not shown here, we have
found that IOB does not seem to have any main effects on either O time or L time.
Similarly, there does not appears to be any strong indication of interactions between
BLK and NETWORK or MTC either.
However, when comparing vertically adjacent pairs of panels in Figure 1.15, a
noticeable difference emerges, suggesting an interaction between BLK and DISK.
This is hardly surprising, as we have previously identified possible 3-way interactions
among these two factors along with m or v.
Furthermore, an even more obvious interaction between BLK and REUSE can
be identified by comparing panels across pages. While in general, increasing BLK
from 128 MB to 256 MB improves the O time, REUSE = True clearly decreases
the gain compared with REUSE = False. We shouldn’t be surprised to see their
interaction either. Recall that one reason increasing BLK improves the O time is the
reduced task overhead by having less number of Map tasks, this reduction is partially
offset by turning on REUSE, which already reduces the overhead of each individual
task via reusing JVM.
Effects of BLK on ℓ
Similarly, the main effects of BLK on the ℓ time and its interactions with other
factors can also be assessed via a pair of similar displays as shown in Figure 1.17 and
Figure 1.18. In summary, BLK does not have as strong (positive or negative) impact
on ℓ time as it does on o time, which in in accordance with our intuition as BLK
affects the I/O of HDFS more directly than it does with the actual computations;
and the statistical variability obtained from bootstrap is also larger for the impact of
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BLK on ℓ time, a ±10% range versus a ±5%, similar to the difference of bootstrap
variability between o poly-fits and ℓ poly-fits in Section 1.5.
Link to figure
Figure 1.17.: Impact of BLK on ℓ poly-fits is plotted against m.
Link to figure
Figure 1.18.: 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of bootstrap deviations for impact of
BLK on ℓ poly-fits.
1.6.2 Summary of Effects and Interactions of Hadoop-hardware Factors
We performed similar analysis and assessment to study the effects of other Hadoop-
hardware factors on o time and ℓ time, as well as their interactions. We will skip the
details but only report a summary of our findings.
For the o time, BLK, REUSE, NETWORK, andDISK appear to have a strong
impact while the other factors do not seem to affect the timing much; and due to the
presence of interactions among these factors along with m and v, the improvement
that can be achieved varies with different combinations of factors, with the largest
improve of around 70%. The superior setting of levels of these factors are BLK = 256
MB, REUSE = True, NETWORK = 10 gigabit/sec, and DISK = 12.
For the ℓ time, on the other hand, fewer factors appears to have a strong im-
pact, namely REUSE, MTC, and DISK, and the impact is also generally smaller
compared with that on the o time, with up to a 30% improvement. Recall that the
improvement is quantified by a percentage/ratio instead of absolute time because
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of the use of log scale, the smaller improvement could be attributed to the relative
larger base value of the ℓ time compared with the o time. As for the superior levels
of factors, while REUSE = True and MTC = 16 improves the ℓ time compared
with the other levels of these factors, setting DISK = 12 actually deteriorates the ℓ
time compared with DISK = 6, which is the superior level of DISK for the o time.
We do not have a convincing explanation to offer for this phenomenon, but simply
to note that the improvement in o time surpasses the loss in ℓ time, thus resulting in
an improvement in the combined t time.
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2. BITCOIN DATA ANALYSIS AND MODELING
2.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a de-centralized digital currency system that was implemented and
established in January 2009. Unlike fiat money such as U.S. Dollars, there is no
central authority in the Bitcoin system to issue new money, or validate the transfer of
money; both of these tasks are accomplished through the joint work of participants
in the Bitcoin network. In the past two years, especially after the establishment of
various Bitcoin exchange sites, where Bitcoins can be exchanged from or to local
currencies such as U.S. Dollars and Euros, Bitcoin has become very popular, mostly
due to its ease of use and embedded anonymity in the system.
The ease of use of Bitcoin is straightforward. The Bitcoin system is an online
system and runs on various operating systems and devices, and it is also free to use.
To join the Bitcoin network, one could either download one of many implementations
of the Bitcoin client program, or simply make use of one of many online services.
Making payments or accepting payments with Bitcoins are also free and as easy as,
if not easier than, any other existing online payment system.
The anonymity of the Bitcoin system, on the other hand, is rather debatable and
has drawn much attention in its user community as well as the research community.
We admit that a certain level of anonymity exists in the Bitcoin system, but it might
not be as invulnerable as one would hope. For one thing, the entire history of Bitcoin
transactions is publicly available, which provides an opportunity for passive analysis
of Bitcoin usage such as ours.
We downloaded the Bitcoin transaction data for the first time in May 2013 and
we have been continuing the collection and analysis of the transactions. On May 3rd
2014, we concluded our data collection and obtained the complete Bitcoin transaction
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history data up to that date. We present here a study of the general statistical
properties of the usage of Bitcoin transactions and the usage of Bitcoin addresses.
We have also built profiles for a few groups of popular addresses among which the
addresses share similar behavior. Furthermore, we provide a passive analysis of the
anonymity of Bitcoin system by proposing a classification model to identify payment
and change in majority of the Bitcoin transactions.
2.2 Background
The design of the Bitcoin system was introduced in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto [22],
whose true identity remains unknown and it is not even known whether the name
is real or a pseudonym, or whether the name represents one person or a group of
people. On January 3rd 2009, the very first Bitcoins were minted, quickly followed
by the release of the first Bitcoin client program Bitcoin v0.1 [23], which mark the
establishment of the current Bitcoin network. The Bitcoin system is designed to be
de-centralized and the system is powered by its users with no central authority, such
as a bank; and it also provides a level of anonymity that allows its users to transfer
Bitcoins without giving away personal financial information.
In this section, we describe three of the most fundamental and important aspects of
how the Bitcoin system works: how are Bitcoins transferred, how are Bitcoins minted,
and how are the transfer verified. Chronologically, Bitcoins need to be minted before
they are transferred and verified, however, for simplicity, we start with the transfer of
Bitcoins by introducing Bitcoin transactions and Bitcoin addresses, followed by the
minting of Bitcoins and the verification of Bitcoin transactions. We also discuss the
implication of these design aspects on the anonymity of the Bitcoin system.
2.2.1 Bitcoin Transactions and Bitcoin Addresses
The transfer of Bitcoins, or making a payment in the Bitcoin system, between the
sending entity, or the sender, and the receiving entity, or the receiver, are carried out
34
via Bitcoin transactions. We will refer to these transactions as payment transactions.
The sender and receiver in a payment transaction are identified by the corresponding
Bitcoin addresses. The Bitcoin address(es) that identifies the sender and serves as
the the source of the transaction are referred to as sending address(es); and the
Bitcoin address(es) that identifies the receiver and serves as the destination of the
transaction are referred to as the receiving address(es). In these payment transactions,
the ownership of some amount of Bitcoins is transferred from the sending address(es)
to the receiving address(es).
A Bitcoin address, also known as a public key, is a string of 27–34 alphanumeric
characters, starting with the number 1 or 3. An example of a Bitcoin address is
1KfqhLeiBSaPteVK4RUKgCxBhysr3qLdm1. To obtain a Bitcoin address, a user can
make use one of many Bitcoin client programs or online wallet services, and generate
a pair of public key and private key. The public key is the Bitcoin address, and it
could be made public if the user would like to this Bitcoin address to accept payments
from others. The matching private key proves the ownership of the Bitcoin address,
and allows the user to spend the Bitcoins received in this Bitcoin address. If somehow
the private key is lost or stolen, the user will no longer be able to spend the Bitcoins
in this Bitcoin address, therefore the private keys are usually kept secret.
Once an address is generated by a user, the user can use it to make transactions,
i.e., receiving and sending Bitcoins. It is often helpful to draw the analogy between a
Bitcoin address and an email address. While an email is sent from the sender’s email
address to the receiver’s email address(es), Bitcoins are transferred from sending
address(es) to receiving address(es); just like one person can possess many email ad-
dresses, a user can generate and own as many Bitcoin addresses as wanted. However,
unlike a new email address can be used to send emails immediately after generation,
a newly generated Bitcoin address can not be used to send Bitcoins unless it has
received some amount of Bitcoins from other address(es). So the life of a Bitcoin
address always begins with a receiving transaction, where it receives some amount
of Bitcoin from other address(es). The same Bitcoin address can be used repeatedly
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to receive in multiple transactions, and consequently it can be used to send multiple
times. However, it is often suggested that one should generate a new address for
every transaction in order to achieve better privacy.
In a payment transaction, a single sending address could be used to provide fund-
ing, or many sending addresses can be pooled together. Each sending address, accom-
panied with its digital signature and the reference to a previous receiving transaction,
in which this address has received some amount of Bitcoins, provides (partially) the
funding for the current transaction. The digital signature is produced by the private
key and proves the sender’s ownership of the sending address; and the reference to
the previous receiving transaction identifies the source of the funding. Notice that
since there is no central authority, such as a bank, to keep track of the account bal-
ance of any sending address, the address alone is not enough to identify the source
of the funding. However, when combined with the reference to a previous receiving
transaction, the source of funding is uniquely identified, because what is being spent
is exactly what has been received previously. Also when there are multiple sending
addresses in a transaction, the addresses might not be unique. This happens when
the same sending address have received Bitcoins in multiple transactions previously
occurred, and these (address, signature, previous receiving transaction) tuples could
be combined as the source in a single transaction.
As for receiving, Bitcoin transactions also support multiple receivers, i.e., there
could be one or many receiving addresses in the same transaction. In fact, as we
shall see in Section 2.4, the majority of transactions have more than one receiving
addresses. In a single transaction, the receiving addresses might not be unique either,
and they can even be the same as the sending addresses, meaning the sender could
be sending Bitcoins to himself/herself.
With the help of Bitcoin client programs and online wallet services, it is fairly easy
to make a Bitcoin transaction. The sender needs to know the address(es), as string(s)
of characters, from the receiver(s), and specify it as the receiving address(es). It is
also possible for the sender to select the source of funding, i.e., the tuple(s) of (send-
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ing address, signature, previous receiving transaction), but usually the program will
automate the selection and complete the transaction for the sender. The transaction
is then broadcasted to the Bitcoin network by the sender’s program, later relayed by
other peers in the network, and eventually received by the receiver(s).
Obviously, a payment transaction needs to be verified before the receiver(s) are
certain that there are sufficient funds, and the sender is not double-spending them.
However, the receiver(s) of the transaction usually do not make the effort to verify the
transaction themselves. Instead, a particular group of entities in the Bitcoin network,
referred to as the miners, would verify the transactions on behalf of the whole Bitcoin
network. This process is called mining.
2.2.2 Mining and Verification of Transactions
The verification of payment transactions is carried out by the miners in the Bitcoin
network through the mining process. Each of the miners verifies a certain number
of payment transactions and shares the verification with the entire Bitcoin network.
Miners also verify the verification produced by other miners so that no miner is able
to trick the whole system. Besides verification of payment transactions, the mining
process also issues/mints new Bitcoins into circulation and it is the only way of
generating new Bitcoins.
During the mining process, each miner works independently and picks up the
payment transactions occurred in the Bitcoin network during the past few minutes’
interval (usually 10 minutes or so), and verifies those transactions by digging into
the history of transactions to ensure sufficient funds and to prevent from double-
spending. Besides the verification of transactions, which can be completed very
quickly with moderate computation power, the miners also need to work on a much
more computation-intensive task named proof-of-work [24]. While working indepen-
dently, the first miner to finish the verification and the proof-of-work task will create
a block of transactions, including those payment transactions that have just been
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verified and a special generation transaction, and inform the whole Bitcoin network
by broadcasting the block into the network. Upon receiving a newly generated block,
other miners will give up the unfinished work, instead verify the block they have just
received, and then start generating the next block by verifying the subsequent trans-
actions occurred in the next few minutes’ interval, as well as working on the next
proof-of-work task. Because the miners verify the previous blocks produced by other
miners, no miner would be able to smuggle invalid transactions in the blocks unless it
can consistently out-computes all other miners, which is very unlikely given the large
number of existing miners in the Bitcoin network.
All the blocks generated by the miners are indexed by a block height, an integer
starting from 0 and incremented by 1 for each subsequent block. The very first block
created in the Bitcoin network is referred to as the genesis block. Because the miners
would verify the previous blocks when generating any new blocks, each subsequent
block generated is said to have confirmed its previous blocks. This chronological
chain of confirmed blocks, or more formally the blockchain, consists of all the verified
Bitcoin transactions, and it is shared in the Bitcoin network to serve as the honest
history of the Bitcoin transactions. In practice, the number of confirmations of a
transaction, i.e., the number of subsequent blocks since the block that included this
particular transaction had been generated, is often used by the receiver(s) of this
transaction as a measure of confidence that this transaction is valid and the sender
can not change the transaction anymore [22].
One might wonder why the miners are making the effort to verify transactions for
the entire Bitcoin network. They are certainly not doing it for free. There are two
incentives provided by the Bitcoin system: (1) the miner who generated each block
will be rewarded a certain amount of Bitcoins, referred to as the block rewards; (2) in
each Bitcoin transaction, the sender has an option to specify a transaction fee, and
the fee is also collected by the miner who generated the block, to provide an incentive
for the miners to give higher priority of verification to this transaction over others
during the same time period.
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When a miner successfully generated a block, the block rewards and combined
transaction fees are sent to the receiving address(es) specified by the miner in a
special transaction named the generation transaction. The generation transactions
differ from payment transactions in that there are no sending addresses and the
source is referred to as the Coinbase. Notice that the block rewards are newly minted
Bitcoins and this is how new Bitcoins are issued in the Bitcoin system. The number
of Bitcoins in the block rewards was 50 BTC at the inception of Bitcoin and is halved
every 4 years or so. To prevent miners, especially those with high computation power,
from generating blocks too fast and causing inflation in the currency, the difficulty of
proof-of-work is automatically adjusted by the Bitcoin system to ensure a projected
growth of Bitcoins in circulation.
With the increasing difficulty of proof-of-work, mining with low computation
power can take a very long time and it becomes very unlikely for those miners to
generate blocks. In order to take advantage of the embarrassingly parallel nature of
proof-of-work and generate blocks in a reasonable amount of time, pooled mining has
become very popular, where multiple individual miners contribute to the generation
of a block, and then split the block rewards according their contributions [25].
2.2.3 Anonymity in the Bitcoin System
One advantage of the Bitcoin system over most of the other digital payment
systems is its anonymity and many users adopt the Bitcoin system because of the
anonymity. The anonymity of the Bitcoin system has also drawn a lot of attention
from the research community, such as [26] [27] [28] and [29]. It is true that there is
a certain level of anonymity imbedded in the Bitcoin system, mostly due to the non-
centrality and the usage of addresses instead of registered account names, however,
as we shall see, using Bitcoins might not be as anonymous as one would have hoped.
First of all, an entity, including both individual users and organizations, does not
need to give away any personal information in order to acquire and use Bitcoin ad-
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dresses through the Bitcoin client programs. Thus, although the complete history of
Bitcoin transactions between addresses is publicly available, the entities behind these
transactions and addresses are anonymous, unless they voluntarily give away iden-
tification information, e.g., when publicly asking for donations to certain addresses.
However, if the entities choose to use one of many online wallet services instead of
the client programs, they usually would have to go through a registration process and
thus give away certain identification information, such as email addresses, to those
services. Furthermore, when entities “cash out” Bitcoins they own into local currency,
they would usually go through the Bitcoin exchange sites, where more identification
information, such as bank information, would have to be exposed to these exchange
sites.
Secondly, one could, or as generally suggested one should, generate a new address
for each transaction, and consequently each entity could potentially own many dif-
ferent addresses and this leads to a many-to-one mapping from addresses to entities.
Furthermore, whether or not two addresses belong the same entity is unknown to
the public. However, due to the design of the Bitcoin system, certain grouping of
addresses into entities is possible. As introduced in [22] and [26], and further studied
in [30] [31] and [28], the sending addresses in the same transaction are owned by
the same entity. For example, if address A1 and A2 are both sending addresses in a
transaction T1, then A1 and A2 are owned by the same entity; furthermore, if A2 is
used as sending address in another transaction T2 with another sending address A3,
then A1, A2, and A3 are all owned by the same entity. We will refer to these addresses
as having co-sending relations, and the unions of addresses with co-sending relations
form a conservative estimate of entities in the Bitcoin system. The co-sending rela-
tions based grouping of addresses into entities is conservative because it is entirely
possible that the same entity could own multiple such unions of addresses.
Thirdly, another level of anonymity in the Bitcoin system is that the intention of
a transaction is generally not explicitly specified and thus often unknown to others
outside of the entities involved in the transaction. This is largely due to the existence
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of change address in the Bitcoin transactions, which is ubiquitous in Bitcoin trans-
actions because of an important aspect of the design of the Bitcoin system: Bitcoins
can not be spent as a fraction. What this means is that, once an (sending address,
signature, previous receiving transaction) tuple is used in a transaction, all the Bit-
coins associated with this tuple are considered as spent, and this tuple can no longer
be used to send in another transaction. This may sound bizarre at first, but recall
that there is no central authority to keep track of the balance of addresses and to
validate transactions, this spend-all-or-none design greatly simplifies the verification
of transactions: the miner only needs to search the history for the previous transac-
tion(s) referenced in this transaction, and check if there is sufficient fund and if there
are other transactions referring to the same tuple to prevent from double-spending.
Obviously, it is impractical to assume that, in a transaction, the amount in the (ad-
dress, previous receiving transaction) tuple(s) happens to be exactly the same as the
desired receiving amount, so there is usually a change in a transaction. And assuming
that a rational user does not simply give up Bitcoins, the change needs to be sent back
to an address of the sender’s, and more importantly, this has to be done in the same
transaction as if the change is just another receiving instance. Note that the users
do not need to take care of the change manually because the Bitcoin client programs
or the online wallet services have made this process automatic. Nonetheless, this has
a significant impact on how a Bitcoin transaction would look like from an outsider’s
point of view. Because of the change, there are usually more than one receiving ad-
dress in a Bitcoin transaction, including both the actual receivers’ address(es), or the
payment address(es), and the sender’s change address. However, the transaction itself
does not explicitly reveal which one of the receiving addresses is the change address,
so the actual payment(s), or the intention of the transaction, is unknown to an out-
sider. In [27] and [28], researchers have demonstrated methods/heuristics to identify
those change addresses automatically generated by Bitcoin client programs and online
wallet services; and in this study, we also propose a model that effectively identifies
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payment and change in majority of the transactions, revealing the true intentions of
Bitcoin transaction hidden behind seemingly unrelated addresses.
Lastly, to further obfuscate the source and destination of a Bitcoin transaction and
improve privacy, users can make use of one of many mixing services [32] when making
transactions. A mixing service is a third-party service, and it mixes the transactions
between multiple senders and multiple receivers by having the senders send Bitcoins
to address(es) owned by the service, and then the service sends specified amount
of Bitcoins, not necessarily the same Bitcoins it has received from senders, to the
targeted receivers specified by the senders. In this way, the senders and receivers are
not directly associated in a transaction, and thus privacy is improved. However, due
to the centrality introduced by the mixing services and the security of these services
themselves, mixing services have received limited popularity among Bitcoin users.
Also, as suggested in [29], because of the limited user base, many of these mixing
services are not able to effectively obfuscate the transactions, making it possible,
sometimes easy, to track the real source and destination of transactions.
2.3 Initial Analysis: Data and Statistics
The Bitcoin transaction history data, namely the blockchain, is available to the
whole Bitcoin network via the Bitcoin client program. Many of the online wallet
services also provide access of the blockchain and allow queries for individual or
batch transaction level information or address level information. However, in order to
perform a comprehensive analysis such as ours, the blockchain needs to be downloaded
and processed into suitable formats and structures. In this section, we describe the
procedures of our data collection and initial processing, followed by summary statistics
of the obtained blockchain. Further processing of the data into multiple databases
of various structures are discussed in details in the following sections along with the
corresponding analyses enabled and facilitated by each database.
42
2.3.1 Data Collection and Initial Processing
The first step of our data collection is to run the Bitcoin client program, Bitcoin
Core version 0.9.1 [33], on our computers in order to sync to the to Bitcoin network
and download the whole blockchain. During the sync process, the Bitcoin client
program connects to the Bitcoin network, and starts to download the blocks from
other peers in the network until it catches up with the up to date blockchain by finish
downloading the most recent blocks. On May 3rd 2014, we stopped the sync process
and concluded our data collection, giving us the raw blockchain from the very first
block up to block 298,851 generated on May 3rd 2014. The raw blockchain data was
in binary format of around 24 GB stored in a database system named LevelDB [34],
and the transaction level data needed to be extracted and converted into text files
for further processing.
Secondly, the extraction of transaction level data and the conversion from binary
to text format were done via one of the APIs [35] supported by the Bitcoin client
program. We extracted all the transactions in the blockchain and they were converted
into a plain text file of around 29 GB. Each line of the text file corresponded to the
information of a sending address or a receiving address in a transaction, and the
following information was included for each transaction:
1. The transaction ID, which uniquely identifies each transaction.
2. The receiving address(es).
3. The index of each receiving address in this transaction, i.e., the order in which
this receiving address is specified in this transaction, starting from 0 and incre-
mented by 1.
4. The amount of Bitcoins, in the unit of BTC, received by each receiving address.
5. The sending address(es).
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6. The transaction ID of each referenced receiving transaction for each sending
address.
7. The index of each receiving address in its referenced receiving transaction.
8. The height of the block that included this transaction.
9. The time that the block was generated.
Thirdly, in order to incorporate the co-sending relations based grouping of ad-
dresses with the transaction level data, we used a modified version [36] of Ivan
Brugere’s Bitcoin-Transaction-Network-Extraction tools [37] and re-organized the
transaction level data. We have made numerous improvements through our modifi-
cation, most importantly, our modifications recovered various important information
that was missing in the data produced by the unmodified tools, including the send-
ing/receiving addresses and their indices in corresponding transactions, which are
essential for tracking referenced transactions, and we also corrected the handling of
a few problematic addresses, where the unmodified tools incorrectly treated them as
the same address, etc. During this step of processing, the following information was
added to the transaction level data in addition to the above list for each transaction:
10. The entity ID of each receiving address, while the entities are formed based on
co-sending relations.
11. The entity ID of the sending addresses.
Additionally, besides the raw blockchain, we also downloaded external data for
the daily exchange rate from bitcoin (abbreviated as BTC) to United States Dollar
(USD) from the Bitcoin Block Chain Explorer website [38]. The data was in CSV
format of 50 KB.
Finally, due to the relatively large size of the data, it calls for a distributed compu-
tation system for the comprehensive analysis. We made heavy use of the Tessera D&R
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Computational Environment [8], particularly the R and Hadoop Integrated Program-
ming Environment [12], or RHIPE, to carry out the computations and analyses. The
resulting text files from the previous steps were processed, and various databases of R
objects were created to facilitate different analysis threads, including the transaction-
based database for analyzing properties of transactions, the address-based databases
for analyzing properties of addresses, etc. The structures of these databases and the
procedures to create them are described in Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.5.1.
2.3.2 Summary Statistics and Growth of Bitcoin
Overall, the data we have collected consists of all the verified Bitcoin transactions
over the period of 5 years, from Jan 3rd 2009, when the Bitcoin system was created,
up to May 3rd 2014, when we completed the data collection. There are a total
of 298,851 blocks in the blockchain, consisting of 37,993,792 transactions between
34,999,937 addresses. As of May 3rd 2014, there are a total of 12,721,275 Bitcoins
that have been minted. With an exchange rate of 434.5 USD for 1 BTC on May 3rd
2014, these Bitcoins are worth a total of $5,527,393,988.
On Jan 3rd 2009, the first block, or the genesis block, was created including a single
generation transaction, which is the first transaction ever. This marks the inception
of the Bitcoin system and the blockchain. Since then, the Bitcoin system has drawn
more and more attention, especially in the recent couple of years. Figure 2.1 shows
the growth of daily number of transactions in the Bitcoin system.
Link to figure
Figure 2.1.: Daily number of Bitcoin transactions.
From Jan 2009 to Jan 2010, the daily transaction count stayed at a relatively low
and constant level, with around 100–130 transactions per day. As shown in Figure 2.2,
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the majority of the transactions during this time period were generation transactions,
and there were very few payment transactions made. At that time, the users of the
Bitcoin system were mostly those people who were interested in this new technology
and were capable of setting up the mining system to obtain Bitcoins. The technology
barrier for acquiring Bitcoins and using them had limited the popularity of the Bitcoin
system among general users and the system was more of a plaything for tech-gurus
than a method of payment.
Link to figure
Figure 2.2.: Daily fraction of generation transactions.
From Jan 2010 to June 2011, there had been a very rapid growth in the number
of transactions, due to the increased publicity of the Bitcoin system and the estab-
lishment of various Bitcoin exchange sites, including the very first exchange site the
Bitcoin Market [39] established on Feb 06th 2010 and a later but much more popular
exchange Mt. Gox [40] established on July 17th 2010. These exchange sites had
enabled a much wider range of users to participate in the Bitcoin network, by offering
both conversion service between Bitcoins and the local currencies, which made the
acquisition of Bitcoins much easier for users than mining their own blocks, and the
online wallet service, which also made the transaction of Bitcoins easier. The fraction
of generation transactions among all transactions also started to decrease rapidly as
more users started to transfer Bitcoins between their addresses, and more payment
transactions were made during this period.
From June 2011 to April 2012 and from April 2012 to May 2014, the Bitcoin
system has become very popular and the daily transaction count remained at a very
high level, around 4,000 and 32,000 transactions per day, respectively, with a steady
growth during each of these two time periods. The payment transactions started
to dominate the daily transactions while the fraction of generation transactions de-
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creased to around 2% and then to less than 1%. During this time, the ecosystem
around Bitcoin has been spawned, with many more individuals and organizations
starting to accept Bitcoins as a method of payment, and a variety of new services
being established for various purposes, such as online gambling services. Notably, on
April 2012 the SatoshiDice [41], a Bitcoin-based online gambling service, was started
and it was solely responsible for the jump of daily number of transactions between
the two time periods. The SatoshiDice service is studied in details in Section 2.5.3.
Due to the tremendous amount of popularity the Bitcoin system has gained in
the recent years, the value of Bitcoins, in terms of local currencies, has increased
significantly, albeit the fluctuation of this immature market. Figure 2.3 shows the
exchange rate from BTC to USD, and the value of a Bitcoin has increased from just a
few cents, when Bitcoin exchange sites were established, to several hundreds of dollars
in recent weeks, with the value peaking at about $1,150 in December 2013.
Link to figure
Figure 2.3.: Daily exchange rate from BTC to USD.
2.4 Transaction Based Database
The first database we have created is the transaction based database, in which each
transaction is a unit of data record and the transactions can be accessed individually,
in a batch, or as a whole. The transaction based database has enabled and greatly
facilitated our analysis of the general properties of all 37,993,792 transactions in
our data, including 298,851 (less than 1%) generation transactions and 37,694,941
payment transactions.
In this section, we describe the design and structure of the transaction based
database, as well as the procedures to create the database, followed by the analysis of
47
various properties of the transactions, including the usage of addresses, values trans-
acted, etc. Due to the difference in functionalities between generation transactions
and payment transactions, their properties are analyzed separately in the following
sections.
2.4.1 Design and Construction of the Transaction Based Database
In order to analyze the properties of transactions, we often need to compute
various variables from the transactions, such as the number sending/receiving ad-
dresses, the values transferred, transaction fees, etc. Since these computations are
all performed on a per transaction basis, it is necessary and convenient to construct
a database in which each transaction is a unit of data record consisting of all the
information we have about this transaction. However, the text file of the transaction
level data generated through the initial processing described in Section 2.3.1 does
not organize the data in such a way, instead, each line of the text file corresponds to
the information of a sending address or the information of a receiving address in a
transaction. Thus, a mergence of the sending information and receiving information
of the same transaction into a single object is needed.
One reason behind the inconvenient structure of the text file, inconvenient in a
data analyst’s point of view, is the difficulty to represent a transaction as a single
line in the text file, because transactions could have different numbers of sending
addresses and different numbers of receiving addresses, which results in a variable and
potentially large number of fields in the text file if we were to represent a transaction in
a single line. Therefore, suitable data structures are also needed for the representation
of a transaction in the database.
Furthermore, due to the design of the Bitcoin system that transactions refer-
ence to previous transactions and are referenced by following transactions in order
to determine the source of funding, certain information regarding a transaction are
not explicitly available in the current transaction without the knowledge of refer-
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enced transactions and referencing transactions. For example, the amount of Bitcoins
brought into the current transaction by each sending address is not available until we
trace back to the referenced receiving transaction; whether or not the received Bit-
coins of each receiving address were spent, and if so, when were they spent, are also
unknown based on the current transaction alone. Therefore, this derived information
from related transactions needs to be computed and merged into each transaction in
the database.
Fortunately, with the help of RHIPE, which integrates R and Hadoop, the mer-
gence of sending information and receiving information into transaction objects, the
computations of derived information from related transactions, and the suitable data
structures to represent transaction objects, are readily available: while R provides
rich and generic types of data structures that suit the needs, Hadoop enables the ef-
ficient processing of GBs of text file and computations over millions of records. Here
we describe in details the procedures to construct the transaction based database via
RHIPE on a cluster of 11 servers and 242 processors.
Transfer Text File into HDFS.
The text file of the transaction level data is transferred from the local file system
of the cluster to the HDFS, where the file is broken into smaller pieces for efficient
processing and distributed to the servers on the cluster. This step is achieved through
RHIPE function rhput().
Input data A plain text file consisting of 37,993,792 transactions scattered into
185,229,749 lines. Each line corresponds to the sending information for each
sending address or the receiving information for each receiving address in a
transaction. Lines for sending information contains 8 tab-delimited columns:
(1) an indicator that says this is sending information, (2) the current transaction
ID, (3) the referenced transaction ID, (4) the index of the sending address in
the referenced transaction, (5) the sending address, (6) the entity ID of the
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sending address, (7) the time of the block that included this transaction, and
(8) the block height of the block. Lines for receiving information also contains
8 tab-delimited columns, but the contents are different: (1) an indicator that
says this is receiving information, (2) the current transaction ID, (3) the index
of the receiving address in the current transaction, (4) the receiving address, (5)
the entity ID of the receiving address, (6) the amount of Bitcoins received, (7)
the time of the block that included this transaction, and (8) the block height of
the block.
Output data The same text file on HDFS.
Create Initial Database of Transaction R Objects
The transaction objects are constructed by merging the sending information and
receiving information in the text file, as well as the exchange rate data. Transactions
are identified by the transaction ID and each transaction is stored in an R list object,
consisting of 5 or 6 named elements depending on the type of the transaction. For
a payment transaction, the list contains 6 named elements: the names and contents
of the first 4 are (1) time, the time of the block that included this transaction, (2)
block, the block height of the block, (3) sender, the entity ID of the sender entity,
and (4) btc2usd, the exchange rate from BTC to USD on the date of transaction,
and these four elements are all in the form of a numeric vector of length 1; the
last 2 are data frames, one data frame named sending contains sending information
with variable number of rows and 3 columns, (1) address, each sending address,
(2) transaction, the referenced transaction ID of each sending address, (3) index,
the index of each sending address in its referenced transaction, and the other data
frame named receiving contains receiving information with variable number of rows
and 4 columns, (1) address, each receiving address, (2) receiver, the entity ID of
each receiving address, (3) index, the index of each receiving address in the current
transaction, (4) value, the amount of Bitcoins received by each receiving address.
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For generation transactions, because there are no sending addresses or referenced
transactions, the element sending is removed and the rest of the list is the same as
payment transactions.
We make the choice to use an R list to represent a transaction because we needed
various structures, in this case numeric vectors and data frames, to represent different
pieces of transaction information, and R lists provide the flexibility of incorporating
various data structures. The list structure also enables fast access to each piece of
information by name, e.g., if trx is the R list object of a transaction, the time of the
transaction can be accessed by trx$time and the receiving addresses can be accessed
by trx$receiving$address in R, respectively.
The initial database of transaction R objects is constructed through a MapReduce
job described below.
Input data The text file of transaction level data on HDFS.
Output data 37,993,792 transactions, each in the form of a key-value pair, with the
transaction ID as the key, and an R list containing transaction information as
the value.
Map Parse each line of the text file as a character string. For each line, or each piece
of sending information or receiving information, the current transaction ID is
extracted and used as the key of the intermediate data. An R vector containing
the rest of the fields of the line is used as the value of the intermediate data.
Intermediate data containing such key-value pairs are transferred to Reduce.
Reduce All the pieces of sending information and receiving information correspond-
ing to the same transaction are assembled, re-organized and stored as an R
list described as above. During this step, the exchange rate data is also made
available across the whole cluster as an R data frame, and the exchange rate on
the date of transaction is looked up and appended to the R list object. With
the transaction ID as the key, and the R list as the value, a key-value pair is
outputted for each transaction.
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Compute Derived Information from Related Transactions
The transaction R objects in the initial database do not contain the information
such as how much Bitcoins were brought in by each sending address, when were they
received, when were the Bitcoins received in the current transaction spent. This in-
formation can be derived after the current transaction is correlated with its referenced
and referencing transactions. In order to obtain the derived information, the trans-
action objects are disassembled into one piece of receiving information, consisting of
the element receiving along with other information regarding the current transac-
tion, and many pieces of sending information each consisting one row of the element
sending along with other information regarding the current transaction. The receiv-
ing information in the current transaction are matched with the corresponding pieces
of sending information from its referencing transactions, and similarly, each piece of
sending information is matched with the corresponding receiving information from its
referenced transaction, and then the derived information is computed and exchanged.
This process is accomplished in a MapReduce job described below.
Input data 37,993,792 transactions from the previous step.
Output data 125,120,532 pieces of sending/receiving information, each in the form
of a key-value pair, with the current transaction ID as the key and an R list
containing sending/receiving information and the derived information as the
value.
Map For each transaction object, one key-value pair is generated as intermediate
data for the element receiving and one key-value pair is generation for each
row of the element sending. For receiving, the current transaction ID is used
as the key, and a subset of the elements in the transaction object, including
time, block, sender, btc2usd, and receiving are extracted and used as the
value. For each row of sending, the referenced transaction ID is extracted as
the key, and rest of the row, along with the current transaction ID, time, and
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block, are extracted and used as the value. Intermediate data containing such
key-value pairs are transferred to Reduce.
Reduce Receiving information and its pieces of referencing sending information are
assembled and the derived information is exchanged. More specifically, after
matching receiving and its referencing sending information by address and in-
dex, the receiving values, time and block of the receiving transaction for each
address are copied from receiving information to each of the referencing sending
information; the sending transaction ID, time and block of the sending transac-
tion for each address, are copied from each sending information to the receiving
information. After the exchange of information, the receiving information are
outputted as the value with the current transaction ID as the key; each sending
information are outputted as the value with the referencing transaction ID as
the key.
Construct the Final Transaction Based Database
After the computation and exchange of the derived information between each
transaction and its referencing and referenced transactions, a final transaction object
with the derived information is formed by re-assembling its sending information and
receiving information. Similar to the initial database, transactions are identified by
the transaction ID and each transaction is stored in an R list object, with the same
5 or 6 named elements as the initial database. However, the derived information is
now contained in the elements sending and receiving.
More specifically, in addition to the first 4 named elements of numeric vectors of
length 1: (1) time, the time of the block that included this transaction, (2) block,
the block height of the block, (3) sender, the entity ID of the sender entity, and
(4) btc2usd, the exchange rate from BTC to USD on the date of transaction, the
transaction R object also includes a data frame sending containing a variable number
of rows and 6 columns: (1) address, each sending address, (2) transaction, the
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referenced transaction ID of each sending address, (3) index, the index of each sending
address in its referenced transaction, (4) value, the value brought in by each sending
address, (5) time, the time when each sending address received these Bitcoins, (6)
block, the block in which each sending address received these Bitcoins; and a data
frame receiving containing a variable number of rows and 7 columns, (1) address,
each receiving address, (2) receiver, the entity ID of each receiving address, (3)
index, the index of each receiving address in the current transaction, (4) value,
the amount of Bitcoins received by each receiving address, (5) transaction, the
transaction ID in which the received Bitcoins were spent, (6) time, the time when
the received Bitcoins were spent, and (7) block, the block in which the received
Bitcoins were spent. If the received Bitcoins of a receiving address in a transaction
are not yet spent, then the corresponding entries of transaction, time, and block
in the data frame receiving is assigned with NA.
The final transaction based database is constructed in the following MapReduce
job.
Input data 125,120,532 pieces of sending/receiving information from the previous
step.
Output data 37,993,792 transactions, each in the form of a key-value pair, with the
transaction ID as the key, and an R list containing transaction information as
the value.
Map For each piece of sending/receiving information, the key-value pair is outputted
as it is.
Reduce All pieces of the sending information and the receiving information corre-
sponding to the same transaction are assembled. Duplicated information be-
tween pieces of sending information and receiving information is removed and
the rest of the information are stored in an R list object. With the current trans-
action ID as the key, and the R list as the value, a key-value pair is outputted
for each transaction.
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With the construction of the transaction based database, individual queries of spe-
cific transactions can be made directly to the database, and batch or entire database
scan can also be easily accomplished through MapReduce jobs with the database
provided as the input. Thus the computations of variables on a per transaction basis
have been made very easy and efficient.
In the following subsections, we make heavy use of the transaction based database
and analyze various properties of generation transactions and payment transaction,
such as the growth of daily transaction, the number of addresses used, values of
Bitcoins involved, and how fast Bitcoins are spent, etc.
2.4.2 Analysis of Properties of Generation Transactions
The generation transactions are created by miners that generated each block of
the blockchain. The miners that created each block had verified the payment trans-
actions included in the block on behalf of the Bitcoin network, and as a reward for
their service, the block rewards and the combined transaction fees from the included
payment transactions were sent to the miners via the generation transaction in the
block.
The generation transactions can be extracted from the transaction based database
by simply filtering those transaction objects where the element sending is missing.
There are a total of 298,851 blocks in the blockchain and each block consists of a
single generation transaction and zero or many payment transactions. The block
rewards in the generation transactions are newly minted Bitcoins, and the number
of Bitcoins minted per block/generation transaction was 50 BTC when the Bitcoin
system was started, and is halved every 210,000 blocks or about 4 years, with the
current block rewards being 25 BTC. This results in a controlled supply of the Bitcoin
as a currency and the number of Bitcoins in existence will never exceed 21 million.
As of May 3rd 2014, there are a total of 12,721,275 Bitcoins minted.
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The Growth of Generation Transactions
To prevent the miners from creating too many blocks too fast and thus causing
inflation in the Bitcoin currency, the difficulty in creating blocks, which is largely the
computation effort to complete the proof-of-work, is adjusted by the Bitcoin system
so that the blocks are created at a relatively constant rate, about one block every
10 minutes. As shown in Figure 2.4, the number of generation transactions has
remained at around 27–28 per day since January 2010 despite the rapid growth of
usage of Bitcoins during this time period. Before January 2010, however, the daily
number of generation transactions was significantly lower, and this is simply because
the lack of popularity of the Bitcoin system and the low value of Bitcoins, and thus
there were too few miners and those miners were not working hard enough to create
blocks.
Link to figure
Figure 2.4.: Daily number of generation transactions.
Usage of Addresses
In generation transactions, the miners can specify one or many receiving addresses.
On September 14th 2010, the block rewards and combined transaction fees in block
79764 were sent to two receiving addresses, and this is the first occurrence of split
allocation in generation transactions. Overall, the distribution of number of receiving
addresses in generation transactions is very skewed as shown in Figure 2.5. There is
only one receiving address in over 95% of the generation transactions, and we will
refer to these as single-receiving generation transactions; however, there are a large
number, in hundreds, of receiving addresses in very few generation transactions, with
the largest being 919 addresses. Recall that miners can work as individual miners or
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participate in mining pools in the Bitcoin network, the dominance of single-receiving
generation transactions does not necessarily imply that most of the blocks are mined
by individual miners. In fact, as we shall see in Section 2.5.4, mining pools, especially
a few major ones, are also specifying a single address to receive the block rewards
and combined transaction fees in generation transactions and then re-distribute the
earnings to its participants in a series of following transactions.
Link to figure
Figure 2.5.: Quantiles of number of receiving addresses in generation transactions.
How Fast Are Minted Bitcoins Spent
The Bitcoins received by the miners in generation transactions are usually spent
fairly quickly, either transferred to other addresses owned by the miners, or re-
distributed to the participants of the mining pools. We quantify how fast these
Bitcoins are spent by the number of confirmations waited before they are used as
funding sources in following transactions. As shown in Figure 2.6, in over 50% of
the generation transactions, the Bitcoins are spent with less than 27 confirmations,
or within 24 hours; and in about 70% of the generation transactions, the Bitcoins are
spent with less than 210 confirmations, or within a week.
Link to figure
Figure 2.6.: Quantiles of number of confirmations before the Bitcoins in generation
transactions are spent.
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It is also worth noting in Figure 2.6 that there are 39,460 generation transactions,
or 13% of all generation transactions, in which the Bitcoins have not yet been spent
as of May 3rd 2014, with a total value of 1,899,484 BTC, or 15% of all minted
Bitcoins. These Bitcoins were never in circulation after being minted and remain
dormant ever since. (The term “dormant Bitcoin” were introduced in [31].) In fact,
most of these generation transactions occurred in the earlier days of the Bitcoin
system. As shown in Figure 2.17, by the end of 2010, the number of such generation
transactions had reached about 35,000, and the value of dormant Bitcoins had already
reached 1,757,705 BTC; since 2011, the number of such generation transactions had
only increased slightly and the Bitcoins minted during this time period had been in
circulation; in the most recent months, there was a small jump in the number of such
generation transactions, likely due to the fact that this is close to the end of our data
collection and the Bitcoins minted in those generation transactions were too new to
be spent.
Link to figure
Figure 2.7.: Cumulative number of generation transactions in which the Bitcoins
minted were not spent as of May 3rd 2014.
The reason that these Bitcoins were never spent after minted is unknown, except
that those newly minted ones which might be spent soon. It could simply be that
the earlier miners/owners of these Bitcoins have lost their private key, thus effectively
the control/ownership, to the receiving addresses in those generation transactions
and were not able to spend those Bitcoins anymore. Since the earlier miners in the
Bitcoin network were mostly playing with this new technology and might not foresee
the value of Bitcoins nowadays, it is possible that they did not make any effort to
preserve the Bitcoins they have obtained through mining. Nevertheless, this large
amount of dormant Bitcoins still pose a threat to this immature Bitcoin market as
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one can imagine the impact they would have to the value of Bitcoins if they were
somehow recovered and entered into circulation.
Notice that in Figure 2.6, the largest number of confirmations for the Bitcoins
minted in a generation transaction to be spent is 282,031, and it turns out that the
Bitcoins in this particular generation transaction were minted on January 30th 2009
and were spent 5 years later on February 2nd 2014. So even the earliest minted
Bitcoins can still be and are being recovered. In fact, there are 2,298 generation
transactions with a total value of 114,902 BTC that were spent 3 or more years after
they were minted. Given the current value of Bitcoins in local currencies, it is no
surprise that the earlier miners are doing whatever they can to recover those Bitcoins
they have minted.
2.4.3 Analysis of Properties of Payment Transactions
Payment transactions are used to transfer Bitcoins from the address(es) of the
sender to the address(es) of the receiver(s). They can be extracted from the transac-
tion based database by simply filtering those transaction objects where the element
sending is not missing. There are a total of 37,694,941 payment transactions, that
is over 99% of all transactions, and payment transactions have dominated the daily
transactions in the Bitcoin network since June 2011. In this section, we break down
the steps of making a payment transaction, and explore the properties of each in the
data.
Usage of Addresses
To make a payment in Bitcoin via a payment transaction, the payer/sender first
must possess one or many addresses that have previously received some amount of
Bitcoins in previous generation or payment transactions. If the sender owns multiple
such addresses or a single address that have previously received Bitcoins multiple
times in a single or multiple transactions, the sender could customize which of them
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will be used as sending addresses in this payment transaction. However, for conve-
nience, most of the available Bitcoin client programs and online wallet services can
automate the selection of sending addresses and complete the transaction for the
sender.
The overall distribution of the number of sending addresses in payment transac-
tions is shown in Figure 2.8. Overall, in about 62% of the payment transactions,
there is a single sending address; and in all other transactions, two or more sending
addresses are pooled together to provide funding for a single transaction. The num-
ber of sending addresses in a single transaction can be as large as 2,585, however, the
fraction of transactions with 20 or more sending addresses is fairly small, being less
than 1%.
Link to figure
Figure 2.8.: Quantiles of number sending addresses in payment transactions.
We refer to those payment transactions with a single sending address as one-
sending transactions and all other transactions with two or more sending addresses as
multi-sending transactions. The relative volume of these transactions changed along
time and is suggesting that the usage of sending addresses in payment transaction
is evolving, as shown in Figure 2.9. Prior to March 2011, there were not sufficient
payment transactions and thus the fraction of one-sending transactions varied quite
a lot; however, since payment transactions began to dominate daily transactions in
March 2011, about 80% of the payment transactions were one-sending transactions,
and the fraction has gradually decreased to about 50% since then. The increasing
usage of multi-sending transactions is suggesting that, as more and more payment
transactions are made, Bitcoins are more often broken into smaller bills and then
merged when spent. This also increases the occurrence of co-sending relations between
addresses and will impact the anonymity as discussed in Section 2.6.
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Link to figure
Figure 2.9.: Monthly fraction of one-sending transactions.
After taking care of the sending addresses, the next step of making a payment
transaction is for the sender to specify the receiving address(es) of the receiver(s) of
the payment. The sender can specify any number of receiving addresses to transfer
Bitcoins to, and the receiving addresses need not to be unique, which means the sender
can even transfer Bitcoins to the same address multiple times in a single transaction.
The distribution of the number of receiving addresses in payment transactions is
quite skewed as shown in Figure 2.10. In majority of the payment transactions there
are a very small number of receiving addresses, with about 6% of the payment trans-
actions having a single receiving address, about 87% having two receiving addresses,
and about 4% having three receiving addresses; the remaining 3% of payment trans-
actions have four up to hundreds or thousands of receiving addresses, with the largest
number of receiving addresses being 3,075.
Link to figure
Figure 2.10.: Quantiles of number receiving addresses in payment transactions.
We refer to those transactions with a single receiving address as one-receiving
transactions, those with two receiving addresses as two-receiving transactions, and
the remaining transactions as three-or-more-receiving transactions. The change in
the relative volume of these transactions along time is shown in Figure 2.11. Before
March 2011, none of the payment transactions had three or more receiving addresses,
and actually there were not many other payment transactions in the Bitcoin network
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either, which explains the fluctuation of the fraction of one-receiving transactions
and two-receiving transactions; after March 2011, payment transactions started to
dominate daily transactions and nearly 90% of them were two-receiving transactions;
however, in the most recent months, the fraction of two-receiving transactions had
seen a slight decrease to about 80%, while the other two taking about 10% each.
Link to figure
Figure 2.11.: Monthly fraction of one-receiving, two-receiving, and three-or-more-
receiving transactions.
Certainly users in the Bitcoin network could be, and in fact they have been, tak-
ing advantage of the ability to transfer Bitcoins to as many as thousands of receiving
addresses in a single transaction, however, recall the existence of change addresses
discussed in Section 2.2.3, while there are two receiving addresses in a two-receiving
transaction, one of the two is the change address to collect the change for the sender,
and the other is the payment address that belongs to the true receiver of the transac-
tion. So effectively, there is only one receiver in a two-receiving transaction and the
dominance of two-receiving transactions is simply reflecting the fact that most of the
payment transactions are from the sender to a single receiver. Similarly, there is at
least one change address, in some cases there could be more than one, in three-and-
more-receiving transactions, making the effective number of receivers less than the
number of receiving addresses in those transactions.
Transaction Values
After specifying the sending addresses and receiving addresses, the sender then
needs to specify the receiving values, i.e., the amount of Bitcoins to be sent to each of
the receiving addresses. The smallest unit of Bitcoin is a “satoshi”, which is 10−8 of
62
one bitcoin (BTC), so the receiving values are always multiples of a satoshi. However,
it is possible to transfer 0 BTC to a receiving address in a transaction, and there have
been multiple occurrences of such zero value transactions.
In a one-receiving transaction, the payment value being transacted is the receiving
value of the single receiving address. In two-receiving transactions and three-or-more-
receiving transactions, however, the actual payment values are unknown due to the
existence of the change addresses. So instead, we will study the overall values of
Bitcoins being involved in each transaction.
We define the transaction value of a payment transaction to be the value being
involved, i.e., it is the combined values in the sending addresses in this transaction.
Figure 2.12 shows the overall distribution of transaction values. The transaction
values can be as small as 0 satoshi and as large as 550,000 BTC; the median of
transaction values is close to 1 BTC and over 80% of the values are within the range
of 2−5 BTC to 25 BTC.
Link to figure
Figure 2.12.: Quantiles of transaction values in payment transactions.
As Bitcoins become more valuable in local currencies, the transaction values have
become smaller in recent years, meaning more small bills of Bitcoins are being trans-
ferred. As shown in Figure 2.13, there was a decreasing trend in the monthly per-
centiles of transaction values. Since May 2012, the monthly median values of transac-
tion values had remained less than 1 BTC except in a couple of months, which means
over 50% of payment transactions involved less than 1 BTC; by the end of April 2014,
the 3rd quartile had dropped to 1 BTC and 75% of payment transactions involved
less than or equal to 1 BTC. The big drop in percentiles between April 2012 to June
2012 can be attributed to SatoshiDice, which was established April 2012 and began to
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contributed to a significant proportion of payment transactions in the Bitcoin network
since then. More details about SatoshiDice are discussed in Section 2.5.3.
Link to figure
Figure 2.13.: Monthly selected percentiles of transaction values in payment trans-
actions.
Transaction Fees
Before the sender completes a payment transaction, the last step, which is op-
tional, is to specify a transaction fee to be collected by the miner who would later
include and verify this transaction when generating a block. Effectively, the transac-
tion fee is computed as the (positive) difference between the combined sending values
and the combined receiving values, and any amount of Bitcoins that is not sent to
receiving addresses will be considered as the transaction fee. It is often suggested
that the transaction fee should be a fraction of the payment value, e.g., 5% of the
payment, but transaction fees are voluntary on the part of the senders, as they can
include any fee or none at all in a payment transaction. On the other hand, the min-
ers need not necessarily to process this transaction and include it in the new block
being generated, which means the verification/confirmation of this payment transac-
tion could be delayed. Therefore, the transaction fee is an incentive from the sender
to make sure that a particular transaction will quickly get included into one of the
following blocks being generated. Furthermore, in a lot of popular implementations of
the Bitcoin client programs and online wallet services, there is a default transaction
fee imposed when making a payment transaction [42], especially on those with a very
small amount of transaction values involved.
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It is shown in Figure 2.14 that with the increased usage of the Bitcoin system in
the past few years, more and more payment transactions were made with a transaction
fee. Prior to January 2011, there were very few payment transactions made and a
very small fraction of them were made with a transaction fee; however, since then the
fraction had increased significantly, especially from April 2012 to June 2012, when
the fraction had doubled and kept increasing to over 95% in the recent months.
Link to figure
Figure 2.14.: Monthly fraction of payment transactions with a transaction fee.
It seems that the users in the Bitcoin network are being good citizens and paying
the transaction fees as a good gesture, however, considering the fact that a default
transaction fee is usually imposed by the Bitcoin client programs and online wallet
services the users are using, the users are actually being forced to pay the fees, un-
less they have sufficient technical knowledge to either utilize the low level Bitcoin
raw transaction [43] or take advantage of other non-standard implementations of the
Bitcoin client program without enforced transaction fee [44]. This is also partially re-
flected in Figure 2.15 of the quantiles of overall transactions fees, where a few popular
values dominates in the transactions, as opposed to a less concentrated distribution
one would expect if the transaction fees are paid as the suggested fraction of payment
values. A few popular values are 0.001 BTC, 0.0005 BTC, 0.0002 BTC, and 0.0001
BTC, and their combined fraction of payment transactions is over 91%. These val-
ues happen to be the default amount of transaction fees imposed by those popular
implementations of Bitcoin client programs and online wallet services . Therefore,
while the most technical users are able to avoid the transaction fees, less technical
users, which likely are the majority in the user community, have to pay a fee for the
transactions they are making. And of course, the default fee has declined by a factor
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of 100 from 0.01 BTC in the earliest days of Bitcoins to the recent 0.0001 BTC as
the exchange rate has risen.
Link to figure
Figure 2.15.: Quantiles of transaction fees in payment transactions.
How Fast Are Bitcoins Spent
After a payment transaction has been created and broadcasted by the sender, it
will be relayed by the participants of the Bitcoin network, and eventually be picked
up by the targeted receiver(s) and the miners. Before getting a sufficient number
of confirmations from the miners, this transaction can still be voided and excluded
from the blockchain. However, the received Bitcoins in each receiving address are
available to be spent in another payment transaction immediately after the original
transaction is created. Of course, if the original transaction is voided and excluded
from the blockchain, all following transactions will be voided as well.
It is suggested in [22] that a minimum of 6 confirmations, which is about 1 hour, is
needed to ensure that a transaction is valid, and typically merchants accepting Bitcoin
as a method of payment require much more confirmations before they ship out their
products. However, after tracking all receivings instances that have been spent on or
before May 3rd 2014 in all payment transactions, we found out that Bitcoins received
are often spent faster than that. As shown in Figure 2.16, in about 45% of all receiving
instances the received Bitcoins were spent with less than 6 confirmations, and about
16% were even spent without any confirmation at all.
Link to figure
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Figure 2.16.: Quantiles of number of confirmations before received Bitcoins are
spent.
One typical situation that the received Bitcoins could be safely spent with few or
even none confirmations is the existence of change addresses: if the receiving instance
in a payment transaction is the receiving of the change, then the sender is certain
that the original transaction is valid and thus continue to spend the change received
without taking any risk. Furthermore, there are various other situations where the
receiver deliberately spend the received Bitcoins very fast, including SatoshiDice,
which is discussed in Section 2.5.3.
2.4.4 Analysis of Dormant Bitcoins
As we have seen in Section 2.4.2, there are a noticeable amount of dormant Bitcoins
that have not yet been in circulation as of May 3rd 2014 since they had been minted.
In fact, there are also Bitcoins that are transferred in payment transactions for a
period of time after minted in generation transactions, and then became inactive ever
since, further reducing the amount of Bitcoins in circulation.
Combining both generation transactions and payment transactions, Figure 2.17
shows that, for any given date, the cumulative amount of Bitcoins that have become
inactive since then, i.e., those Bitcoins were never spent from that date up to May
3rd 2014. By the end of 2010, there were about 2 million dormant Bitcoins, among
which 1.76 million were contributed by generation transactions. By the end of 2013,
the amount of dormant Bitcoins had reached 4 million BTC and the increase was
mostly due to inactive Bitcoins received in payment transactions. As it gets closer
to the end of our data collection, the amount of “dormant” Bitcoins quickly climbed
up, simply because there had not been enough time for them to be transferred again.
And lastly, the value on the top right corner in the figure, which reads 12.72 million
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BTC on May 3rd 2014, corresponds to the total amount of Bitcoins that have been
minted so far.
Link to figure
Figure 2.17.: Cumulative amount of Bitcoins that were not spent from any given
date to May 3rd 2014.
Therefore, of all the Bitcoins that have minted so far, over 30% have been out of
circulation for over one and a half years, suggesting that the remaining Bitcoins have
been transferred very frequently considering the large number of Bitcoin transactions
we have seen in the recent years. Also, as we have discussed before, the large amount
of dormant Bitcoins are posing a threat to the immature Bitcoin market as they
could enter or re-enter into circulation and shock the market. In fact, similar to
what we have seen for the dormant Bitcoins in generation transactions, the ancient
Bitcoins in payment transactions could also be discovered and become active again.
In Figure 2.16, the largest number of confirmations for the Bitcoins received in a
payment transaction to be spent is 267,338, corresponding to a payment transaction
occurred in February 2009, where the received Bitcoins were spent about five years
later.
2.5 Address Based Databases
Addresses identify the sender and receiver entities of a transaction. Studying the
profile or usage pattern of addresses is very important, if not more important than
studying transactions themselves, to understand how the Bitcoin system is being used
and to study various entities in the Bitcoin network. Through our analysis, we have
found that the usage pattern of an address can often be characterized by 3 groups of
properties of this address, and address based databases that contain these properties
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for each address are needed to enable efficient access and analysis of these properties,
as well as the creation of visualizations for these properties on a per address basis.
The first group of properties aim to summarize the activity level of the addresses.
An activity of an address is essentially a transaction this address is used in, and we
define 4 types of activities for an address based on how this address is being used
in each transaction: (1) if this is a generation transaction, this address is receiving
the block rewards and we say that this address is conducting a generation activity;
(2) in a payment transaction, if this address is a receiving address but not a send-
ing address, we say that this address is conducting a receiving activity; (3) if this
address is a sending address but not a receiving address, we say that this address is
conducting a sending activity; (4) and if this address is both a sending address and
a receiving address in the same transaction, then we say that this address is con-
ducting a self-sending activity. Generation, receiving, and self-sending activities are
receiving related activities as the address is receiving some amount of Bitcoins, and
sending and self-sending activities are sending related activities as the is spending
some amount of Bitcoins. The activity level of an address can then be summarized
by a few variables: first of all, the overall level of activity of an address, i.e., the
number of transactions of an address, and the number of activities of each type tell a
lot about how actively this address is being used; furthermore, the time and block of
the beginning and ending of sending/receiving related activities, and the number of
active blocks, i.e., the number of blocks this address is conducting activities, provide
information about this address’s lifetime; lastly, the ending account balance of an
address, i.e., how much Bitcoins this address has received but not yet spent as of
May 3rd 2014, often gives a reasonable indication on whether or not this address will
remain active. These variables are aggregated summaries and they take one value for
each address, and they should be included in the address based database.
The second group of properties summarize the usage of addresses in those activi-
ties of a particular address. These include the distributions of the following variables
across all or some types of the activities of this address: (1) the number of sending ad-
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dresses and number of receiving addresses in the activities of each type; (2) in sending
related activities, where this address is a sending address, the number of replications
of this address as the sending address, i.e., the number of times this address is speci-
fied as the sending address in the same transaction; (3) in receiving related activities
where this address is a receiving address, the number of confirmations this address
waited before the Bitcoins received are spent; (4) the number of receiving activities of
this address contributed by each sender entity. These variables quantify how many as
well as how fast addresses are used, and a representation of their distributions should
be included in the address based database.
The third group of properties carry the detailed information of each individual
activity, including the activity type, time and block of this activity, and the amount
of Bitcoins of this address that are involved in this activity. These properties are
no longer aggregated or summarized information as the previous two groups are, and
the address based database should nonetheless include them to provide comprehensive
information regarding activities.
In the following subsections, we first describe our design and structure of various
address based databases that enable query and analysis of those properties for all
34,999,937 addresses, along with the construction of these databases, then we present
our analysis of various properties of these addresses, and we conclude this section by
the studies of a few representative groups of addresses with typical usage patterns.
2.5.1 Design and Construction of the Address Based Databases
The address based databases are created from the transaction based database as
described in Section 2.4.1, where activities/transactions are conveniently stored as
stand-alone objects. However, for each transaction object in the transaction based
database, the information contained needs to be propagated for each address used in
this transaction and then all pieces of transaction information of the same address
need to be assembled to produce those properties mentioned above.
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One naive design of an address based database that contains all the properties for
each address is simply to form a list object consisting of all the activities/transactions
for each address after they are assembled. Certainly, thus constructed database con-
tains all the information we would need since we would be able to compute all the
properties for each address given the list of all its transactions. However, there are
two issues with this design. Firstly, because of the propagation of transactions for
every address in a transaction, the size of the resulting database becomes quite large
as there are usually at least 3 or more addresses in a transaction, and this would
hurt the efficiency of accessing the database and consequent analyses. Secondly, as
we shall see in Section 2.5.2, there are a few addresses that have been used in a huge
number of transactions, in the order of millions, thus the size of the list objects of
all transactions for these addresses would exceed the upper limit on the size of a
single object in R and these list objects will have to be broken into smaller pieces,
which quickly complicates the computation of those properties since the information
for a single address could potentially span across multiple list objects in the database
and these objects need to be assembled before the computation and analysis of those
properties.
Therefore, instead of storing all activities/transactions of an address as a list
object in the address based database, we decide to extract and compute the variables
of those properties and store them with suitable data structures for each address
in our address based databases. We have created three independent address based
databases, one for each group of properties, where individual queries for a particular
address and batch or entire database scan can be made to any one or any combination
of these databases. Note that these databases could be easily merged into a single
database, but we choose not to do so simply because we constructed these databases
sequentially during different stages of our analysis and having three independent
databases provide the same level of accessibility and efficiency with slightly more
flexibility compared to a single database. Also, as new property variables are being
discovered during the interactive analysis, it is usually easier and more efficient to
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create additional address based databases for these properties than to re-compute all
the old properties and merge them with the new ones.
Here we describe in details the procedures to construct these address based databases
via RHIPE on a cluster of 11 servers and 242 processors.
Construct the Activity Level Summary Database
The activity level summary object consists of the following variables for each
address: the total number of activities, the number of activities of each type, the
time and block of the beginning and ending of sending/receiving related activities,
the number of active blocks, and the ending account balance. For each transaction
object and each address in the transaction, these variables are computed and then
aggregated by address to produce the activity level summary object for each address.
Each activity level summary object is stored as an R named vector of numeric values,
each of which corresponds to a variable.
The activity level summary database is constructed in the following MapReduce
job.
Input data The transaction based database, consisting of 37,993,792 transactions,
each in the form of a key-value pair, with the transaction ID as the key, and an
R list containing transaction information as the value.
Output data 34,999,937 activity level summary objects, each in the form of a key-
value pair, with the address as the key, and an R vector containing activity level
summary information of the address as the value.
Map For each transaction and each address in the transaction, indicator variables
that indicate whether or not this activity is of a particular type for this address
are formed, the time and block of this transaction are extracted, and if this
address is a receiving address and the Bitcoins received are not yet spent, the
balance is assigned with the receiving value, otherwise it is assigned with 0.
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With the address as the key, and an R vector consisting of those variables with
proper names as the value, the key-value pairs are transferred to Reduce.
Reduce All activities of the same address, in the form of R vectors, are assem-
bled. The summary variables are computed: each of the indicator variables is
aggregated across all activities, the max and min of time and block for send-
ing/receiving related activities are computed, the number of unique blocks and
the balances are also aggregated. The summary variables are again stored in an
R named vector. With the address as the key, and the R vector as the value, a
key-value pair is outputted for each address.
Construct the Address Usage Summary Database
The address usage summary object consists of information about the distributions
of the following variables for each address: the number of sending addresses and
number of receiving addresses in the activities of each type, the number of replications
of this address as the sending address in sending related activities, the number of
confirmations this address waited before the Bitcoins received are spent in receiving
related activities, the number of receiving activities of this address contributed by each
sender entity. Due to the skewness and extreme values in these variables, the mean
and standard deviation are not suitable summaries for their distributions, instead,
we compute up to 5,000 quantiles with probabilities equally spaced between 0 and
1 for each variable. The address usage summary object is formed as an R list, each
element of which corresponds to a variable and is formed as an R data frame of up
to 5,000 rows and two columns: the f-value and corresponding quantiles.
The address usage summary database is constructed in the following MapReduce
job.
Input data The transaction based database, consisting of 37,993,792 transactions,
each in the form of a key-value pair, with the transaction ID as the key, and an
R list containing transaction information as the value.
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Output data 34,999,937 address usage summary objects, each in the form of a key-
value pair, with the address as the key, and an R list containing address usage
summary information of the address as the value.
Map For each transaction and each address in the transaction, the type of activity
is determined, the number of sending/receiving addresses, the number of repli-
cations and the number of confirmations are computed, and the sender entity
ID is extracted. Notice that unlike the other variables, the number of values
for the number of confirmations could exceed 1 if the same address is specified
as receiving address multiple times. So each of these variables are stored as an
R vector, and an R list consisting of these vectors is formed. With the address
as the key, and the R list as the value, the key-value pairs are transferred to
Reduce.
Reduce All activities of the same address, in the form of R lists, are assembled. The
variables are re-organized by type of activities, and the quantiles are computed
and formed as an R data frame. For the sender entity variable, the number of
activities by sender entity is computed and the quantiles are obtained. With the
address as the key, and an R list of those data frames as the value, a key-value
pair is outputted for each address.
Construct the Activity Detail Database
The activity detail object consists of detailed information about each individual
activity: the type of this activity, the time and block of this activity, and the amount
of Bitcoins of this address that are involved in this activity. Each activity detail
object is constructed as an R data frame with each row being an activity.
The activity detail database is constructed in the following MapReduce job.
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Input data The transaction based database, consisting of 37,993,792 transactions,
each in the form of a key-value pair, with the transaction ID as the key, and an
R list containing transaction information as the value.
Output data 34,999,937 activity detail objects, each in the form of a key-value pair,
with the address as the key, and an R data frame containing activity detail
information of the address as the value.
Map For each transaction and each address in the transaction, the type of activity is
determined, the time and block of this activity, as well as the amount of Bitcoins
involved are extracted, and these variables are formed into an R vector. With
the address as the key, and the vector as the value, the key-value pairs are
transferred to Reduce.
Reduce All activities of the same address, in the form of R vectors, are assembled.
The vectors are binded into an R data frame with each vector/activity being a
row in the data frame, and the data frame is then ordered by time of activity.
With the address as the key, and the data frame as the value, a key-value pair
is outputted for each address.
With the construction of the address based databases, queries of individual address
or groups of addresses can be made directly to the databases and their properties can
be obtained, and entire database scan for all addresses can also be accomplished
through MapReduce jobs. In the following subsections, we first present an overview
of properties of all addresses by utilizing the activity level summary database, then
we focus on a few specific groups of addresses with interesting and representative
usage patterns by making heavy use of all three databases.
2.5.2 Analysis of Properties of Addresses
As of May 3rd 2014, we have observed a total of 34,999,937 addresses that have
ever been used in the Bitcoin network. While there are groups of addresses shar-
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ing similar usage patterns, the properties could vary drastically from addresses to
addresses.
Activity Level of Addresses
The distribution of number of activities/transactions of all types for each address
is shown in Figure 2.18. Clearly, the distribution is very concentrated and heavy-
tailed: close to 5% of addresses have conducted only 1 activity, in which the address
is receiving and the Bitcoins received are never spent; over 80% of addresses have 2
activities, most likely 1 receiving activity followed by 1 sending activity draining the
address; less than 1% of addresses have conducted 28 or more activities, however, there
are a small number of popular addresses that account for a significant proportion of
all the activities, with the largest one conducting 3,153,571 activities, in other words,
this address has occurred in 8.3% of all transactions. We should also notice that when
the the number of activities is small, the address count/fraction for odd numbers of
activities is always smaller than that of the subsequent even numbers, and this is
hardly surprising, as it is simply suggesting that many addresses are used in as many
sending activities as receiving activities. Therefore, the majority of addresses are used
only a small number of times and are never used again, while very few address have
been used extraordinarily frequently. It is generally suggested that a new address
should be generated for every receiving related activity, in order to achieve better
privacy, and our observation does suggest that many addresses are generated and
used in this way.
Link to figure
Figure 2.18.: Quantiles of number of activities/transactions of all types for each
address.
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Figure 2.19 compares the distribution of the number of activities/transactions
for each address with the Pareto distribution, and this gives a better visualization
of the tails of the distribution. Notice that in the top right corner, there are two
groups of adjacent points having similar values on the horizontal axis within groups,
suggesting that there are two clusters of addresses with similar number of activities.
These turned out to be addresses belong to a popular Bitcoin based gambling service,
the SatoshiDice, and in fact, many of the top addresses, including the largest one
with 3,153,571 activities, also belong to SatoshiDice. The SatoshiDice addresses are
analyzed in details in Section 2.5.3.
Link to figure
Figure 2.19.: Pareto quantile-quantile plot of number of activities/transactions of
all types for each address.
For each address, the number of sending related activities, including sending and
self-sending, is plotted against the number of receiving related activities, including
generation, receiving, and self-sending, in Figure 2.20. This figure is produced via
R package “hexbin” [45], and it is a variation of the usual scatter plot, but tailored
for large datasets. The values of (x, y) pairs to be plotted are grouped into hexagon
bins and the count of values in each bin is plotted/colored instead of the actual val-
ues. 28,078,037 addresses, or over 80% of all, have exactly 1 sending activity and
1 receiving activity; 2,017,879 addresses, or 5.77% of all, have exactly 2 sending ac-
tivities and 2 receiving activities; 2,032,908 addresses, 5.81% of all, have only been
used in receiving related activities but never been used in sending related activities,
among which, 1,599,702 addresses, or 4.57% of all, have received once and the Bit-
coins received were never spent. For most addresses, the number of sending related
activities is no more than that of receiving related activities. This is because the
Bitcoins received in multiple receiving related activities are often merged to provide
77
funding in a subsequent sending related activity. However, there are a few addresses
that have conducted more sending related activities than receiving related activities,
suggesting that they are receiving multiple times in the same receiving activity and
these receivings are spent separately in subsequent sending activities.
Link to figure
Figure 2.20.: Scatterplot (based on hexagon binning) of number of sending related
activities and number of receiving related activities of each address.
The number of activities/transactions and number of active blocks for each ad-
dress are plotted in Figure 2.21. While majority of the points fall fairly close to
the y = x reference line, suggesting these addresses’ activities are well spread across
blocks, there are addresses whose activities are quite concentrated and producing
hundreds of activities per active block, including those addresses with largest number
of activities/transactions.
Link to figure
Figure 2.21.: Scatterplot (based on hexagon binning) of number of activi-
ties/transactions and number of active blocks for each address.
Inactive Addresses
The account balance of an address at a given time is the sum of received Bitcoins
that are not yet spent at that time. As of May 3rd 2014, 32,098,717 addresses, or
92% of all addresses, have a balance of 0, and only 2,901,220 addresses hold a positive
balance. Notice that it is not possible for an address to have a negative balance, since
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addresses could only spent the Bitcoins they have previously received. Figure 2.22
shows the distribution of balance for addresses with a non-zero balance. Most of these
addresses have a small balance, with about 15% having a balance of only 1 satoshi
and over 90% of addresses having a balance of 1 BTC or less, but a few addresses
have very large balance. In fact, the 1,000 “wealthiest” addresses hold nearly 40% of
all the Bitcoins that have ever been minted. The address with the largest balance is
1FfmbHfnpaZjKFvyi1okTjJJusN455paPH and its balance is 144,341.53 BTC, worth
of over 60 million USD as of May 3rd 2014. This address belongs to the FBI and it
was used to seize the Bitcoins from the alleged owner and operator of “Silk Road”, a
website designed to enable its users to buy and sell illegal drugs and other unlawful
goods and services using the Bitcoin system [46] [47] [48].
Link to figure
Figure 2.22.: Quantiles of account balance as of May 3rd 2014 for addresses with
a non-zero balance.
An ending balance of zero, or in other words, the address has been drained, is
usually an indicator that this address becomes inactive and is likely not going to be
used again. However, addresses with a positive balance could have become inactive
as well, especially when the balance is small. We have observed addresses, such as
a group of addresses belong to SatoshiDice discussed in Section 2.5.3, that had been
used very frequently in some periods of time, and after they had been drained at the
end of these very involved time periods, they received small amounts of Bitcoins, such
as 1 satoshi, during a couple of receiving activities spanned in a much longer time.
Taking into account the fact that a receiving activity is somewhat passive from the
address owner’s point of view compared to other types of activities, because anyone
can just randomly send some amount of Bitcoins to any address, thus the receiving
activities of an address are in less control of its owner, and they could even take place
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with no intentions from its owner involved. We want to note that one of our specu-
lations about the motives of such behavior is that the sender entity is trying to hide
his intention or target of his/her transaction by including some unrelated addresses
as receiving addresses in addition to the targeted receiving address. Verification of
this speculation is very challenging and it is beyond the scope of this study.
With these considerations in mind, we believe that the last sending related activity
of an address is a more reasonable and accurate representation of the address’s last
usage. Thus we define the life time of an address as the time from its first (receiving
related) activity to its last sending related activity, if there is any.
Figure 2.23 shows the distribution of life time (in minutes) of addresses with
at least one sending related activity. About 5.81% of all addresses are excluded
because they have not conducted any sending related activities. Among the remaining
of the addresses, about 15% of them have lifetime as 0 minute, i.e., their sending
activities occurred immediately after their receiving activities and both transactions
were included in the same block; besides those, another 60% of addresses “lived”
shorter than a day and another 20% of addresses were in the range of a day to a
month; however, there are also a few long-lived addresses with a lifetime ranges from
a few months to several years, and the longest lifetime of an address is over 5 years
and it turned out to be one of oldest addresses in a generation transaction being
recovered in February 2014.
Link to figure
Figure 2.23.: Quantiles of lifetime of addresses with at least one sending related
activity.
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2.5.3 The SatoshiDice Addresses and Gambling Services
SatoshiDice [41] is the most popular Bitcoin-based gambling services in the Bitcoin
network, and it utilizes the Bitcoin system to place bets, evaluate the bets, and return
the payouts of the bets. The SatoshiDice service was launched in April 2012 by Erik
Voorhees [49] and remained active as of May 3rd 2014. It is the largest contributor
to the transactions in the Bitcoin network, and its addresses are among the most
actively used addresses in the entire Bitcoin history.
How dose SatoshiDice work
There are 27 different betting games hosted by SatoshiDice, as listed in Table 2.1.
Each of the betting games has a different winning condition, and thus provides a
different odds of winning as well as a correspondingly different return rate. Notice
that in Table 2.1, although it says “Win Odds”, it is actually the probability of
winning a bet: the most difficult-to-win game has merely a 0.0015% chance to win,
but the return is 64,000 times the bet if ever wins; the least difficult-to-win game has a
97.6563% chance to win, and the return is only 1.004 times the bet if wins; other games
have probabilities of winning between these two extremes, and the corresponding
return rates also lie in between.
Table 2.1.: SatoshiDice bet options table.
Link to table
To play a betting game on SatoshiDice, or to place a bet, a player simply needs
to make a payment transaction using the Bitcoin client programs or online wallet
services, and send some amount of Bitcoins, or the bet, to one of the bet addresses
listed in Table 2.1. We will refer to these transaction that are used to place bets as
bet transactions.
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When SatoshiDice receives a bet transaction, it evaluates win or lose and generates
a return transaction, which is also a payment transaction and the return of the bet
is sent back to the player who places the bet. If the bet wins, the return is the bet
multiplied by the prize multiplier in Table 2.1 and that amount is sent back. If the
bet loses, the return is the bet times 0.005, resulting in a number much smaller than
the bet.
If desired, a player can place multiple bets in a single bet transaction by specifying
multiple bet addresses as the receiving addresses. However, each bet will be evaluated
and return independently. For each bet, there will be a return transaction and thus
a bet transaction including multiple bets will spawn multiple return transactions. In
each return transaction, SatoshiDice always includes the corresponding bet it received
as one of the (sending address, signature, previous receiving transaction) tuples, and
this identifies which bet this return transaction is responding to.
Normally, the return of a bet is sent back to the same address that the player
used to place the bet, i.e., the sending address in the bet transaction if there is only
one, or one of the sending addresses if the bet transaction includes multiple sending
addresses. However, SatoshiDice provides a method to have the return sent to a
custom return address specified by the player: if the player adds another receiving
address to the bet transaction in addition to the bet address(es), and send exactly
0.00543210 BTC to it, then the return for the bet will be sent to that address instead.
In order to have the return transactions verified quickly by miners, SatoshiDice
always includes a transaction fee of 0.0005 BTC in the return transactions. When
SatoshiDice sends a return transaction to a player, the transaction fee is subtracted
from the return amount. If this makes the return amount zero or less, the return
is set to 0.00005430 BTC. Notice that the transaction fee in a return transaction
also accelerate the verification of the corresponding bet transaction, because the bet
transaction is referenced in the return transaction, and the miners will need to verify
the bet transaction before they can verify the return transaction.
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The Evolution of SatoshiDice
In April 2012, SatoshiDice launched 24 of its betting games, and later in July 2012,
3 additional betting games were launched. Quickly after its launch, SatoshiDice had
become very popular and started to generate a large number of transactions. Overall,
there are a total of 11,470,008 transactions involving SatoshiDice, either sent to or
from SatoshiDice. That is over 30% of all time transactions in the entire Bitcoin
network!
As shown in Figure 2.24 and Figure 2.25, within weeks after being launched,
SatoshiDice was responsible for around 16,000 transactions daily, or around 50% of
the daily transactions in the Bitcoin network. Up until July 2013, its daily number
of transactions and daily fraction of transactions had remained at a very high level
during that time, with 8,000–32,000 daily transactions and 40%–60% as a fraction of
all Bitcoin transactions.
Link to figure
Figure 2.24.: Daily number of transactions involving SatoshiDice.
Link to figure
Figure 2.25.: Daily fraction of SatoshiDice transactions out of all Bitcoin trans-
actions.
Due to the vast amount of transactions it had generated, SatoshiDice had drawn
a lot attention and debate inside and outside of the Bitcoin user community. Many
Bitcoin users believed that SatoshiDice was spamming the Bitcoin network, and there-
fore should be banned; however, others thought of it as a stress test to the Bitcoin
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system, and as long as it would pay the transaction fees for its transactions, its usage
should be considered valid [50]. Outside the Bitcoin user community, SatoshiDice
also faced various issues because of the gambling nature of the service. In May 2013,
SatoshiDice decided to block all US-based IP addresses attempting to visit its official
website, due to potential legal issues. However, this did not seem to affect its pop-
ularity, as the daily number of transactions shown in Figure 2.24 remained at about
the same level during that time. After all, once the players who wanted to play the
betting games had learned those 27 bet addresses, they could place bets and receive
returns, and bypass the website completely.
On July 18th 2013, Erik Voorhees, the founder of SatoshiDice, announced that
SatoshiDice had been sold for 126,315 BTC, or US$12.4 million at the time of the
announcement [51]. This had raised concerns and caused some insecurity in its user
base and the daily number of transactions plunged from over 16,000 to about 8,000.
Since then, SatoshiDice had become less popular and the daily number of transactions
had gradually decreased to 1,000–2,000 recently. Notice that there was a sizable drop
in the daily number of transactions around October 2013 shown in Figure 2.24, and
this was because On October 31st 2013 SatoshiDice launched the SatoshiDice Tribute
game [52], which claimed to conduct its transactions off the blockchain and thus those
transactions were not included in our data. Unfortunately, the new game was shut
down a month later after being plagued by slow performance, distributed denial of
service attacks and other user related issues.
Bets and Returns
Considering different functionalities, there are three types of transactions involving
SatoshiDice, and they make up the total of 11,470,008 SatoshiDice transactions.
The first type are bet transactions, in which players placed bets by sending Bit-
coins to one or many of the 27 bet addresses listed in Table 2.1, and there are a
total of 5,196,942 bet transactions. Recall that players could place multiple bets in
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the same bet transaction by sending Bitcoins to one or multiple bet addresses one or
multiple times, there are a total of 6,285,179 bets placed in these bet transactions,
and 394,506 bet transactions have multiple bets.
The second type are return transactions, in which the returns of the bets were sent
from SatoshiDice to the players that placed the bets, and there are a total of 6,270,147
return transactions. One thing to note is that the number of return transactions is
larger than the number of bet transactions, and this is due to the existence of multiple
bets in a single bet transaction and each bet resulting in a separate return transaction.
Another thing is that the number of return transactions is smaller than the number
of bets, and in fact, there are no corresponding return transactions for 15,032 bets.
Except for a small number of those bets that were placed towards the end of our
data collection and thus the return transactions might have not been included in our
data, the majority of such bets with no returns had a value less than 0.0001 BTC. We
believe that SatoshiDice simply ignored these bets as the values are much smaller than
the the minimum bet they have specified in Table 2.1. Furthermore, these Bitcoins
received by SatoshiDice in these bets were not spent as of May 3rd 2014, partially
suggesting that SatoshiDice was not trying to trick the players and steal away the
Bets.
The remaining 2,917 transaction are the third type, and we will refer them as
operational transactions. The usage of these transactions are unknown as they are
neither bet transactions or return transactions. Based on manually inspection, most
of these transactions occurred around the time SatoshiDice was just launched, and
we believe that they were mainly used to to initially set up the pool of funds to back
the bets, and some were used to collect and transfer the earnings of the SatoshiDice
service.
Overall, combining all 27 bet addresses, the total value of bets that have been
placed on SatoshiDice is 4,407,347 BTC, and the total value of returns sent back to
players is 4,321,181 BTC. The difference of these two numbers, subtracted by the
total value of transaction fees 5,597 BTC paid out by SatoshiDice, gives the earnings
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of SatoshiDice a total value of 80,569 BTC as of May 3rd 2014, or 1.83% of total
value of bets.
Figure 2.26 shows the number of bets to each of 27 bet addresses. The most
popular bet game is the one with winning probability 48.83%, and there are close
to 1.5 million bets, or around 25% of all the bets, to this bet address; it is closely
followed by 17% of all bets placed on the bet address with winning probability 50.00%
and 9.3% on the bet address with winning probability 73.24%. Interestingly, there
are far more bets placed on the bet address with the lowest winning probability than
any other bet addresses with lower winning probabilities. Gambling, indeed!
Link to figure
Figure 2.26.: Number of bets to each bet address.
According to Table 2.1, there is a minimum on the value of bets for all 27 bet
addresses and the minimum is set to be 0.01 BTC; there is also a maximum on
the value of bets and it varies across bet addresses. Bets that fall outside of the
range are not supposed to be evaluated, and the bets would simply be returned back
to the player. However, in practice, we have observed that bets smaller than the
specified minimum are often accepted and evaluated by SatoshiDice, suggesting that
SatoshiDice did not always respect the specified minimum. The overall quantiles
of values of the bets are shown in Figure 2.27, over 90% of values are fairly small,
within the range from 0.001 BTC to 1 BTC, and around 26% of bets have exactly
the specified minimum value of 0.01 BTC. The largest bet ever placed on SatoshiDice
has a value of 717 BTC, which exceeded the specified maximum, and the bet was not
evaluated and directly returned to the player that placed the bet.
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Link to figure
Figure 2.27.: Quantiles of values of the bets.
As one would have expected, the distributions of values of the bets are different
across bet addresses because of the different odds of winning. This is summarized
in Figure 2.28, where 10 selected percentiles of the values of the bets are plotted
against the odds of winning for each bet address. The lower percentiles across bet
addresses are fairly similar and the values are concentrated around 0.01 BTC; the up-
per percentiles, on the other hand, are generally increasing with the odds of winning,
suggesting players are placing larger bets on easier-to-win games and smaller bets on
harder-to-win games, which is a reasonable betting strategy.
Link to figure
Figure 2.28.: Selected percentiles of values of bets to each bet address.
Besides its ease of use, another important reason that SatoshiDice is able to gen-
erate a large number of transactions is that the betting games are operating with zero
confirmation, meaning the bets are evaluated as soon as SatoshiDice picks them up
from the Bitcoin network, and the return transactions are usually sent back instantly.
Figure 2.29 shows the quantiles of number of confirmations SatoshiDice waited before
sending back the returns. Around 65% of return transactions are within the same




Figure 2.29.: Quantiles of number of confirmations between bet and return.
Finally, in order to verify that SatoshiDice is hosting the betting games at the
odds of winning claimed in Table 2.1, we investigated every bet and return pair and
compared the observed odds of winning with the claimed ones for each bet address.
As shown in Figure 2.30, for majority of the bet addresses, the observed odds are
practically the same as the the claimed ones; for bet addresses with the smallest
winning odds, there are deviations between observed odds and claimed ones. However,
the deviations are likely due to the low odds of winning and thus a small variation in
the number of winning bets to these bet addresses could cause a non-trivial difference
in the observed odds of winning.
Link to figure
Figure 2.30.: Observed odds of winning and claimed odds of winning for each bet
address.
Usage of Bet Addresses and Non-bet Addresses
We have found that SatoshiDice was in control of at least a total of 1,090 ad-
dresses. Besides those 27 bet addresses that SatoshiDice had publicly announced on
their official website as listed in Table 2.1, another set of 1,063 addresses are also
identified as SatoshiDice addresses, and they will be referred to as non-bet addresses
to distinguish them from bet addresses. These non-bet addresses were not publicly
announced by SatoshiDice as their addresses, but they are nevertheless identified as
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such because they have co-sending relations with those bet addresses and with each
other.
SatoshiDice, or more specifically the computer program behind the SatoshiDice
services, makes heavy use of both the bet addresses and non-bet addresses to support
the operation of the betting games. Because they were programmed to do so, the bet
addresses and non-bet addresses are used in very systematic yet distinct ways.
The 27 bet addresses are among the most actively used Bitcoin addresses of all
time, and in fact, 9 of them make it to the top 10 list of addresses by frequency of oc-
currences, and the rest of them are also on the top 130 list. In terms of activity types,
the bet addresses have conducted only receiving activities and sending activities, and
they have never been used in self-sending activities. Furthermore, in terms of func-
tionality, they are only used in bet transactions and return transactions, but never
used in operational transactions. In bet transactions, they are specified as receiving
addresses by the players of SatoshiDice in order to place bets; and in bet transactions
with multiple bets, multiple bet addresses would be specified as receiving addresses
and furthermore, they could even be replicated if the player decided to place multiple
bets to the same bet addresses in a single bet transaction. For every bet sent to a bet
address, the bet address is programmed to quickly reacts to the bet and generate a
return transaction. In return transactions, since SatoshiDice is in control of making
the transactions, the bet addresses are used in a more deterministic fashion: exactly
one bet address will be used as a sending address in each return transaction so that
the return transaction could refer to the corresponding bet that was placed.
The 1,063 non-bet addresses are only used in operational transactions and return
transactions, and their functionalities are quite different from those of bet addresses.
Besides being used in operational transactions either to set up the pool of funds to get
the SatoshiDice service started or to collect and transfer the earnings of SatoshiDice,
the non-bet addresses are mainly used in return transactions for two purposes: (1) to
provide additional funding, and (2) to collect the change.
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The first one is a direct consequence of the fact that SatoshiDice always includes
the particular bet address as a sending address in the corresponding return trans-
action. More specifically, in each return transaction, depending on the result of the
bet, none or some non-bet addresses would need to be included as sending addresses
in addition to the referenced bet address: if the bet wins, the return value would be
larger than the bet, so the tuple of (bet address, signature, bet transaction) alone
does not have sufficient funds to return to the player, therefore one or many non-
bet addresses would be pooled to fund the return transaction; in fact, even if the bet
loses, non-bet addresses were sometimes still pooled in the return transaction to cover
the transaction fees. Figure 2.31 shows the quantiles of number of sending addresses
in return transactions for each bet address. As the winning probability decreases,
the fraction of return transactions that include a single-sending address, i.e., only
the bet address as sending address, increases from less than 10% to more than 60%.
This is because higher winning probabilities lead to higher fraction of winning bets,
and consequently result in higher fraction of return transactions in need of additional
funding. Another interesting thing in Figure 2.31 is that, besides the obvious favor
of one bet address and one non-bet address combination as the sending addresses to
provide funding in return transactions for winning bets, the combination of one bet
address and three non-bet addresses also occurred very frequently, taking up around
20% of return transactions for each bet address.
Link to figure
Figure 2.31.: Quantiles of number of sending addresses in return transactions for
each bet address. Bet addresses are ordered by winning probability.
The second usage of non-bet addresses can be attributed to the existence of change
in any Bitcoin transactions, in this case the return transactions. In each return trans-
action, regardless of win or lose, some amount of Bitcoins is returned to the player’s
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address, and the change of this transaction, if there is any, is then collected by non-bet
addresses. As shown in Figure 2.32, there are only three possible values of the num-
ber of receiving addresses in return transactions: 1, 2, and 3. The value 2 dominates
in return transactions across all bet addresses, meaning in most of the return trans-
actions, one non-bet address was specified as a receiving address in addition to the
player’s address to collect the change; there are very small number of return transac-
tions where the player’s address was the only receiving address, suggesting there was
no change to be collected; there are also a small number of return transactions where
two non-bet addresses were specified as receiving addresses, and it turns out that the
values of change in these return transactions were quite large, and SatoshiDice were
breaking the change into two small pieces for further usage.
Link to figure
Figure 2.32.: Quantiles of number of receiving addresses in return transactions
for each bet address. Bet addresses are ordered by winning probability.
These non-bet addresses, despite not publicly announced, were also used very
frequently as 50 of them make it to the top 80 list of Bitcoin addresses by frequency
of occurrences. Figure 2.33 shows the quantiles of number of activities/transactions
of the non-bet addresses, and three groups of non-bet addresses clearly stand out and
separate themselves from each other and the rest of the non-bet addresses: group 1
consists of 25 addresses and each was involved in 395,000 activities; group 2 consists
of another 25 addresses and each was involved in 84,000 activities; group 3 consists of
1,001 addresses and each was involved in a range of 100–200 activities; and the rest
of 12 addresses all have less than 60 activities.
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Link to figure
Figure 2.33.: Quantiles of number of transactions of non-bet addresses.
The first three groups of non-bet addresses were mainly used in return transactions
to provide additional funding and collect the change, but each group were active in
a different period of time. Addresses in group 3 came out first during the first few
weeks when SatoshiDice was launched, and by the end of May 2012, these addresses
were drained, i.e., all Bitcoins ever received were transferred away, and they had
become inactive ever since. Addresses in group 2 became active in May 2012 and
they replaced group 3 to support the SatoshiDice betting games. In September 2012,
addresses of group 2 were also drained and they were replaced by the addresses
in group 1, which remained active as of May 3rd 2014. In fact, the addresses in
group 2 did not disappear completed from the Bitcoin network. We have observed
a few transactions where addresses in group 2 are specified as one of many receiving
addresses, but the receiving values are quite small and they have never been spent by
SatoshiDice, therefore, we believe that SatoshiDice is not aware of these transactions
and these addresses had indeed become inactive.
Finally, after investigating the properties, we found out that these non-bet ad-
dresses were used in a very similar fashion, if not identical, and we believe that their
migration is simply the result of SatoshiDice upgrading its underlying program that
operates the betting games.
Address/Entity Grouping in Bet Transactions
Thanks to the unique functionalities of the bet transactions to SatoshiDice, we
have identified two facts that could be exploited to further the grouping of addresses
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into entities beyond the grouping based on co-sending relations as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.3.
Firstly, since a player can specify a custom return address to receive the return of
a bet, it is reasonable to believe that this custom return address belongs to this player.
In order to identify the custom return addresses, we search for receiving addresses in
bet transaction that satisfies both of the following two conditions: (1) this address
must not be one of the bet addresses; (2) this address is receiving exactly 0.00543210
BTC. Note that we have found a small number of bet transactions where multiple
receiving addresses satisfy both conditions, while SatoshiDice had treated whichever
address with the largest index, i.e., specified the last among receiving addresses,
as the custom return address to send the return to, we will treat them all as the
custom return address, assuming that the players are simply experimenting to find
out the behavior of SatoshiDice with respect to custom return addresses. We have
thus identified a total of 56,125 bet transactions where at least one custom return
address is present.
Secondly, recall the widely existence of change addresses in payment transactions,
there should also be change addresses in bet transactions, and the change addresses
should belong to the players as well. We argue that that in bet transactions, the
bet addresses are not receiving the change, because they are naturally receiving the
payments, in this case the bets, and they are programmed by SatoshiDice to react to
the bets by sending the returns in return transactions. Thus this leaves one of the
rest of receiving addresses, if there is any, to be the change address. Therefore, in a
bet transaction, if there is only one receiving address that is neither a bet address nor
a custom return address, then we treat this receiving address as the change address.
We have found a total of 5,146,202 bet transactions where the change address can be
identified as such.
Each one of the above two strategies would lead to link up a pair of co-sending
relation based entities, one corresponding to the player entity that placed the bet,
and the other corresponding to the entity that the change/custom return address
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belongs to. Overall, combining both strategies, we have identified 441,736 unique
pairs of entities that we believe could be further grouped into same entities. These
pairs consist of a total of 344,070 entities, and a union-finding algorithm merges them
into merely 14,557 unique entities, a 24:1 ratio of further grouping.
Notice that while the first strategy is somewhat unique in the context of bet
transactions to SatoshiDice, the second strategy, on the other hand, is quite general
and can be extended and applied to many other transactions involving other services.
This is further discussed in Section 2.6.
Other Bitcoin-based Gambling Services
The early success of SatoshiDice has inspired a few other Bitcoin-based gambling
services. These services are not as popular as SatoshiDice, nevertheless, they have
contributed a noticeable amount of transactions in the Bitcoin network, and many
of their addresses have easily made to the top 100 list of addresses by frequency of
occurrences.
A few of the notable gambling services are: the BetCoin Dice [53], established in
July 2013 and responsible for 1,137,443 transactions; the SatoshiBones [54], estab-
lished in September 2013 and responsible for 565,606 transactions; and the Lucky-
Bit [55], established in October 2013 and responsible for 308,620 transactions. Jointly,
they have contributed 5.29% of all time transactions, in addition to SatoshiDice’s
30.19%. And all of these services remained active as of May 3rd 2014 and continued
to generate a non-trivial number of transactions on a daily basis.
These gambling services provide variations of betting games similar to the ones
provided by SatoshiDice and they also operate in a similar way as SatoshiDice op-
erates in terms of handling bets and returns, more specifically, they also make use
of bet addresses to receive and react to bets and non-bet addresses to provide addi-
tional funding and to collect change, etc. The same analysis we have performed for
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SatoshiDice could readily be applied to these services as well and we will skip the
detailed investigation here.
2.5.4 The DeepBit Addresses and Similar Addresses
DeepBit [56] is one of the largest and oldest mining pools in the Bitcoin network,
and it was established on February 24th 2011 and remained active, although barely,
as of May 3rd 2014.
DeepBit had not revealed its addresses to the public, but one particular address
had been identified by the Bitcoin user community as one of DeepBit’s addresses:
1VayNert3x1KzbpzMGt2qdqrAThiRovi8. We will refer to this address as the Deep-
Bit distribution address, because it was mainly used, or more specifically it was pro-
grammed, to distribute the block rewards DeepBit had earned via the pooled mining
to its participants. This address have been used very heavily, and its usage presents
a typical usage pattern shared by many other addresses.
Transactions involving the DeepBit Distribution Address
The DeepBit distribution address is involved in a total of 786,501 transactions,
or 2.07% of all time Bitcoin transactions, and it is ranked the 5th among all Bitcoin
addresses by frequency of occurrences, the only one on the top 10 list that does not
belong to SatoshiDice. Figure 2.34 shows the daily number of transactions involv-
ing the DeepBit distribution address. In November 2011, the DeepBit distribution
address became active and started to generate 1,000–2,000 transactions on a daily
basis; starting from late 2012, however, due to the growing competition from newly
joined miners and mining pools equipped with various advanced mining technology,
DeepBit was not able to generate as many blocks as it was able to in the previous
year, and the daily number of transactions involving the distribution address had
dropped to 500–1,000 in the following six months; notably, after the establishment
of GHash.IO [57] in July 2013, which later became the largest mining pool in the
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Bitcoin network, the market share of DeepBit continued to shrink and many of its
participants left DeepBit for other mining pools, and the DeepBit distribution address
was generating merely a few transactions a day in recent months.
Link to figure
Figure 2.34.: Daily number of transaction involving the DeepBit distribution
address.
Interestingly, despite being the address of one of most popular mining pools, the
DeepBit distribution address has never conducted any generation activity, i.e., it has
never directly received block rewards from the Coinbase in generation transactions.
Instead, some other temporary addresses, which we believe should also belong to
DeepBit, were used in generation transactions to receive the block rewards; these
addresses were later used in payment transactions, alone or jointly, to send or merge
the rewards to the DeepBit distribution address, and thereafter these addresses were
never used again; finally, the DeepBit distribution address distributed the rewards in
a series of following transactions to many different addresses, which we believe belong
to the participants of the DeepBit mining pool.
We have identified a total of 17,171 (out of 298,851) generation transactions, where
a single temporary address other than the DeepBit distribution address was receiving
the block rewards, and then sent all of them to the DeepBit distribution address in
a later transaction. Furthermore, we have also found a small number of generation
transactions, where the temporary addresses receiving the block rewards sent a frac-
tion of the rewards to the DeepBit distribution address in later transactions. Overall,
the total value of block rewards received indirectly by the DeepBit distribution ad-
dress is 810,723.7 BTC. Notice that the DeepBit distribution address had not been
used by DeepBit until November 2011, about 8 months after the establishment of the
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DeepBit mining pool, the above amount only provides a lower bound of how much
block rewards DeepBit and its participants has earned.
Properties of the DeepBit Distribution Address
Because of the particular functionality as a method of distributing relatively large
amount of Bitcoins to many receiving entities, the usage of the DeepBit distribution
address presents a typical pattern, characterized by its types of activities, the specifi-
cations of sending and receiving addresses when conducting sending related activities,
and the confirmations needed for it to spend received Bitcoins when conducting re-
ceiving related activities.
First of all, the DeepBit distribution address was very frequently used in self-
sending activities, where this address appeared both as a sending address and a
receiving address in the same transaction. There are 768,089 self-sending activities,
taking up to 97.66% of all its activities, 14,293 receiving activities, or 1.82%, and
4,119 sending activities, or 0.52%. The activities of the DeepBit distribution address,
including sending, receiving, and self-sending activities, are shown in Figure 2.35,
where different types of activities are colored differently and plotted as vertical lines
in the order of time of occurrence; the vertical lines originate from 0, and the length
of the lines corresponds to the amount of Bitcoins of this address that are involved
during these activities, and the direction of the lines corresponds to the direction
of the change of account balance of this address, i.e., lines pointing up when this
address’s balance is going up and pointing down when balance is going down.
Link to figure
Figure 2.35.: Activities of the DeepBit distribution address.
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It is easy to see in Figure 2.35 that the activities of the DeepBit distribution
address consist of many cycles of similar series of activities: a series usually starts with
a few receiving activities, where this address received some relatively large amount of
Bitcoins (usually 25 BTC or larger), followed by a much larger number of self-sending
activities and a couple of sending activities, where relatively smaller pieces of Bitcoins
(usually within the range from 0.01 BTC to 1 BTC) were sent away from this address.
Secondly, certain specifications of sending and receiving addresses dominate the
self-sending and sending activities of the DeepBit distribution address. In fact, there
are 759,585 among all 768,089 self-sending activities where one sending address and
two receiving addresses were specified in a transaction; and there are 4,054 among
all 4,119 sending activities where one sending address and one receiving address were
specified. Therefore, in most cases, when the DeepBit distribution address was self-
sending, it was the only sending address and it was also receiving the change while
sending some amount of Bitcoins to another receiving address; when the DeepBit
distribution address was sending, which usually happened after a series of self-sending
activities, it simply sent all the left-over Bitcoins to a single receiving address.
Thirdly, as shown in Figure 2.36, the number of confirmations the DeepBit dis-
tribution address waited before spending received Bitcoins are generally small, yet
the distribution varies in different types of activities. When the DeepBit distribution
address was self-sending, because the Bitcoins it received were the change of this
transaction and the validity was implied, they were usually spent very quickly: over
60% of them were spent without any confirmation, and over 90% were spent with
6 or fewer confirmations; on the other hand, when this address was receiving, most
likely receiving block rewards from those temporary addresses, the Bitcoins received
were spent not as fast, with the corresponding 60% percentile being 5 confirmations
and 90% percentile being 9 confirmations. Given the fast response of the DeepBit
distribution address in receiving related activities, it is likely that this address is han-




Figure 2.36.: Quantiles of number of confirmations the DeepBit distribution ad-
dress waited before spending received Bitcoins.
In summary, the majority of activities of the DeepBit distribution address consist
of many similar series of activities: one receiving activity triggers a long chain of self-
sending activities, and the chain is then concluded with a sending activity. During
each series of activities, a large bulk of Bitcoins received in the receiving activity is
gradually and quickly distributed to a number of receiving addresses, one receiving
address at a time. Therefore, the DeepBit distribution address presents the following
properties: (1) self-sending activities dominate the activities of this address, account-
ing for 97.66% of all activities; (2) in most of its self-sending activities, 98.89% of
all self-sending activities, it is the sole sending address and it is also collecting the
change, while another receiving address is receiving the payment; (3) between con-
secutive self-sendings activities, the number of confirmations is usually small.
Other Distribution Addresses
Powered by the address based databases, we are able to identify many other
addresses that share similar properties as the DeepBit distribution address: these
addresses are mainly conducting self-sending activities, and during these chains of
self-sending activities, these addresses send some amount of Bitcoins to many other
addresses, with one address at a time. All these addresses are, in some sense, “dis-
tributing” relatively larger bulk of Bitcoins into many other addresses.
A couple of notable examples of addresses sharing similar properties are: address
1BTC24yVKQdQNAa4vX71xLUC5A8Za7Rr71 that belongs to Bitcoin-24 [58], one
of the largest Bitcoin exchange site in Europe, and it is mainly used to send to its
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users’ addresses whenever they purchase Bitcoins with local currencies; and address
13x9weHkPTFL2TogQJz7LbpEsvpQJ1dxfa that belongs to Reddit Bitcoin Faucet
[59], a faucet service started by a user of www.reddit.com [60], and the address is used
to give away tiny fractions of Bitcoins for free to many other users of www.reddit.com
for the purpose of promoting the Bitcoins system.
Note that this is certainly not the only way of distributing Bitcoins, and we have
found other addresses with variations of the distribution behavior: these addresses
are also mainly conducting self-sending activities, however, instead of sending to one
other address at a time, many receiving addresses could be specified and thus reduce
the length of the chains of the self-sending activities. A couple of examples of such
addresses are: address 15ArtCgi3wmpQAAfYx4riaFmo4prJA4VsK that belongs to
Bitcoin Faucet [61], another faucet service that used to give away free Bitcoins for
the same purpose of promoting the Bitcoin system from early 2012 to early 2013;
address 1cointQVgw2EwnJx3EFVPvD65gSsD9nJ7 and related addresses that belong
to CoinBox.me [62], a service that enables its users to make micro Bitcoin transactions
while avoiding the transaction fees by merging multiple micro transactions into larger
transactions.
2.5.5 The WikiLeaks Addresses and Similar Addresses
On June 14th 2011, WikiLeaks announced on Twitter that they started accepting
donations in Bitcoin at the address 1HB5XMLmzFVj8ALj6mfBsbifRoD4miY36v [63],
which we will refer to as the WikiLeaks static address.
The WikiLeaks static address has been involved in a total of 2,394 transactions,
several orders of magnitude smaller than the SatoshiDice addresses and the DeepBit
distribution address. Nevertheless, the WikiLeaks static address presents another
typical usage pattern, which is shared by many other addresses. More importantly,
rather than some computer programs behind the SatoshiDice addresses and the Deep-
Bit distribution address, our analysis suggests that the WikiLeaks static address is
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handled by actual human users, which make the analysis more applicable to general
users of the Bitcoin system.
First of all, the activities of the WikiLeaks static address are dominated by re-
ceiving activities, which accounts for 2,286 out of 2,394 transactions, and there are
only a few sending activities along with very few self-sending activities. As shown in
Figure 2.37, a pattern of a long series of receiving activities followed by a few sending
activities emerges during the course of activities of this address. And the receiving
values are usually relatively small compared with the sending values.
Link to figure
Figure 2.37.: Activities of the WikiLeaks static address.
Secondly, these receiving activities of the WikiLeaks static address are contributed
by a relatively large number of sender entities, i.e., this address has received Bitcoins
from many different entities. In fact, there are a total of 2,018 entities sending to
this address in those 2,286 receiving activities. As shown in Figure 2.38, the majority
of the sender entities have sent to the WikiLeaks static address only once and no
particular sender entity stands out.
Link to figure
Figure 2.38.: Quantiles of number of transactions from each sender entity to the
WikiLeaks static address.
Thirdly, when the WikiLeaks static address is conducting sending activities, it
usually pools multiple funding sources in the same transaction. Besides including
other sending addresses, the WikiLeaks static address is often specified multiple times
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as sending addresses in the same transaction. This is demonstrated in the left panel of
Figure 2.39, as the WikiLeaks static address is replicated at least once in the majority
of its sending activities, and sometime it is replicated 10s of times.
Link to figure
Figure 2.39.: Quantiles of number of replications the WikiLeaks static address is
specified as a sending address in each transaction.
In summary, we have learned that the WikiLeaks static address has received small
amounts of Bitcoins from many different entities in many receiving activities, and
these Bitcoins received are often merged into larger pieces and sent away in following
sending activities. Considering the functionality of the WikiLeaks static address,
which is accepting donations from donors, it is very natural that this usage pattern
emerges from this address: various donors make donations by sending Bitcoins to the
WikiLeaks static address, and these donations are then merged and transferred to
other addresses, likely to those exchange services where the Bitcoins are converted
into local currencies.
As of May 3rd 2014, the WikiLeaks static address has received a total of 3,857
BTC as donations. However, these do not include every donation they have received
via the Bitcoin system. WikiLeaks have introduced a mechanism for donors to make
donations to newly generated addresses on their website [64] instead of the static
address, in order to better protect the donors’ privacy. These temporary addresses
are usually used twice, one receiving activity and then one sending activity, and
many of them have been used in the same transactions along with the WikiLeaks
static address to merge the donations.
Finally, we have found that there are many other addresses being used in a similar
way as the WikiLeaks static address: they have been used to receive small amounts of
Bitcoins from many different entities in many receiving activities, and these Bitcoins
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received have been merged into larger pieces and spent in following sending activities.
We will refer to these addresses as static receiving addresses, and we believe that they
are likely the “face” addresses of some individuals or organizations, and they remain
static so that the sender entities could make payments, in the context of WikiLeaks,
make donations, to those individuals or organizations on an ad hoc basis.
It is important to note that these static receiving addresses are unlikely to be
used as the change address in a transaction because they are usually the natural
payment addresses. In Section 2.6.2, we will exploit this fact for the purpose of the
identification of payment and change in a transaction, and an empirical definition of
static receiving address is also provided.
2.6 Modeling: Identification of Payment and Change
As discussed in Section 2.2.3, a change address almost always exists in a payment
transaction to collect the change for the sender, however, it does not distinguish itself
from other receiving address(es), or the payment address(es). Thus, in a payment
transaction with more than one receiving addresses, the addresses receiving the pay-
ments are unknown to the outsider of the transaction, neither are the payment values
being transferred. This greatly complicates the flow of Bitcoins and makes it very
difficult to understand the transactions between entities.
Thus, the identification of payment address and change address become very im-
portant to understand the actual usage of the Bitcoin system. For one thing, being
able to determine which receivings are the payments and which is the change answers
two questions that are trivial in other currency systems, yet quite difficult in the
context of the Bitcoin system, to whom the payment is sent and how much is being
transferred. Furthermore, in the sense of anonymity, the change address identified
can be associated with the sender entity, and thus further improve the understand-
ing of ownership and relationship of addresses beyond the co-sending relations based
grouping into entities discussed in Section 2.2.3.
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The identification of payment address and change address is certainly very impor-
tant and rewarding, yet it comes with great challenges as well. The challenges lie not
only in coming up with heuristics or models for identification, but also the validation
of such heuristics/methods, simply because the lack of truth known to the outsiders
of payment transactions.
In certain transactions, the notion of change does not apply and thus it is trivial
to identify the payments in such transactions. These include 298,851 generation
transactions, in which miner’s addresses receive the block rewards, and 2,371,902
one-receiving transactions, which are payment transactions with a single receiving
address: in generation transactions, there is no change address and all receiving
addresses are receiving the payments, or more specifically, the block rewards; in one-
receiving transactions, obviously the single receiving address is the payment address
and there is no change address involved either. It is entirely possible that a sender
could simply be sending some amount of Bitcoins to his/her own address in a one-
receiving transaction, nevertheless, we can still think of it as a payment, only that
the payment is made to the sender himself/herself.
For all other payment transactions, there are two or more receiving addresses.
We argue that at least one of these receiving addresses is receiving the payment and
at least one other is collecting the change. In theory, it is possible that all of the
receiving addresses are receiving payments, but in reality, the probability of such
events should be very very low for the following reasons. First, it is very unlikely that
the combined sending value in the sending addresses happens to be exactly the same
as the targeted payments, so the probability of not having a change in a transaction is
very low; second, given that there exists the change, a rational sender is very unlikely
to give away the change by not specifying a change address.
For simplicity, we will only target on two-receiving transactions, i.e., payment
transactions with exactly two receiving addresses, and we exclude all three-or-more-
receiving payment transactions in this study. This simplifies the task to be the iden-
tification of which one of the two receiving addresses is the payment address, or
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equivalently, which one is the change address. Recall that around 87% of all payment
transactions are two-receiving transactions and less than 7% of payment transactions
are three-or-more-receiving transactions, the majority of the transactions are well
covered.
In the following subsections, we first identify a collection of two-receiving trans-
actions where the payment and change can be determined easily with a high confi-
dence, we further identify features that could be used to characterize the properties
of payments or changes in this collection of transactions, and finally we propose a
classification model for the identification of payment and change in two-receiving
transactions. We will see that, for three-or-more-receiving transactions, the proposed
model can also be applied with some modifications.
2.6.1 Partition of Two-receiving Transactions
In general, the payment and change of a two-receiving transaction is unknown
to an outsider of the transaction, however, there are certain scenarios where this
information is implied. Recall that the change address is used to collect the change
for the sender entity, thus intuitively the change address should belong to the sender.
Therefore, in a two-receiving transaction, if one receiving address is known to be
owned by the sender while the other is not, then the former address is more likely to
be the change address than the later. We have identified two scenarios in which we
could determine whether or not a receiving address belongs to the sender, and thus
we could identify two corresponding subsets of two-receiving transactions where the
payment and change are known with a high confidence.
The first set are those transactions where one and only one receiving address is
the same as the sending address, or is the same as one of the sending addresses if
there are multiple sending addresses in this transaction. It is obvious this receiving
address belongs to the sender and thus we consider it to be collecting the change. We
will refer to these transactions as same-address transactions.
105
The second set are those transactions where one and only one receiving address is
known to belong to the same entity as the sender via the co-sending relations based
grouping, and thus it is also owned by the sender and collecting the change. We will
refer to these transactions as same-entity transactions.
Besides the same-address transactions and same-user transactions, there are a
relatively small number of two-receiving transactions, or 112,274 transactions to be
exact, where both the receiving addresses are known to be owned by the sender, either
both are identical to the sending addresses, or both can be grouped into the sender
entity based on co-sending relations. In such cases, the sender is simply breaking
larger bulk of Bitcoins into two smaller pieces for future use in these transactions. We
could still reasonably impose a notation of payment and change in such transactions
by claiming that the receiving that is spent first to be the payment and the other to
be the change. However, since these transaction make up a very small fraction of all
the transactions, we decide to simply exclude them from this model.
Furthermore, we also excluded a few notable groups of transactions: the bet trans-
actions to SatoshiDice’s bet addresses, the return transactions from SatoshiDice’s
bet addresses, and the distribution transactions from DeepBit’s distribution address.
There are mainly two reasons for the exclusion of these transactions: (1) as demon-
strated in Section 2.5.3 and Section 2.5.4, it is fairly easy to determine the payment
and change in these transactions and thus there is no need to include them in the
model; (2) these sets of transactions make up a significant proportion of all the two-
receiving transaction, and we do not want to build a model that is tailored to these
transactions.
Finally, we have identified 4,801,793 same-address transactions and 3,169,716
same-entity transactions, where the payment and change are implied. Combining
these two sets of transactions, we have a total of 7,971,509 two-receiving transac-
tions, and these transactions will serve as the model building set from which we would
identify features that characterize the properties of payment and change, and build
and validate a model to classify payment and change. In the remaining 12,915,420
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two-receiving transactions, neither of the receiving addresses is known to be owned
by the sender, and the payment and change are to be determined with the help of the
model. It is important to note that, despite the lack of truth unknown to outsiders
of payment transactions, we were able to identify those transactions where the truth
is implied, and they could be used to validate or evaluate other heuristics or methods
attempting to identify payment and change such as ours.
2.6.2 Feature Identification
After a detailed investigation of the model building set of transactions defined
above, we identified a selection of features that characterize the properties of payment
and change. These features are very intuitive and they include features derived from
the receiving values, features derived from the profile of receiving addresses, and
features describing usage of the receivings, etc.
Complexity of Receiving Values
The complexity of a receiving value is computed in the following way: the receiving
value, in the unit of BTC, is converted to the unit of satoshi by multiplying the value
by 108, this effectively converts the receiving value into integers because satoshi is the
smallest unit of Bitcoin; then the leading and trailing 0’s in the string of the value
are removed; and finally, the complexity of the value is the number of digits in the
resulting string. For example, a receiving value of 0.099 BTC will be converted to
9900000 satoshi, then to “99” after removing the trailing 0’s, resulting in a complexity
of 2 as there are two digits in the resulting string.
The complexity of a receiving value measures how “random” the value string is,
and we argue that in a payment transaction, the complexity of the payment value is
likely not higher than that of the change value. The payment value, which usually
reflects the price of goods or services, are often determined in a systematic way and
tend to be less complex values such as 10 BTC or 0.099 BTC, with a complexity of
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1 and 2, respectively. On the other hand, the change value is the combined sending
values subtracted by the payment value and the transaction fee, which is, while not
zero, usually a small fix amount such as 0.0005 BTC or a fix proportion of the payment
value such as 5%. Thus the complexity of the change value depends on not only the
complexity of the combined sending values, but also the complexity of the payment
value, and possibly the transaction fee. If the combined sending values have a low
complexity and there is no transaction fee, then the complexity of the change value
should be similar to that of the payment value; if the combined sending value has a
high complexity or there is some amount of transaction fee, then the complexity of
the change value is likely to be higher than that of the payment value. For example,
given two receiving values being 0.99 BTC and 0.3757798 BTC in the same payment
transaction, the former is more likely to be the payment and the later is more likely
to be the change.
Therefore, a simple rule to determine the payment and change is to compute
the complexities of both receiving values in the same transaction, and claim the
receiving value with smaller complexity to be the payment and the other to be the
change. Figure 2.40 shows the distribution, in terms of fraction of transactions, of
the absolute value of difference between the complexities of two receiving values in
the model building set of transactions. In around 13% of the transactions in the
model building set, the two receiving values have the same complexity; in the rest
87% of transactions, there is a non-zero difference and the absolute value of the
difference varies from 1 to 11, with more transactions having smaller differences and
less transactions having larger differences.
Link to figure
Figure 2.40.: Fraction of transactions in the model building set against absolute
value of difference between the complexities of two receiving values.
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We apply the above rule to those transactions in the model building set when
there is a non-zero difference between the complexities of two receiving values, and the
results are shown in Figure 2.41. The fraction of transactions in which the receiving
value with a lower complexity is the payment is plotted with the absolute value
of difference between the complexities of two receiving values. The fractions are all
greater than 0.5, suggesting that the payment values are more likely to be less complex
one; and as the absolute value of difference of complexities increases, the fraction
increases from around 0.6 to over 0.95, meaning the less complex value are more
and more likely to be the payment value when the difference between complexities
becomes larger.
Link to figure
Figure 2.41.: Fraction of transactions where the receiving value with smaller com-
plexity is the payment.
Therefore, to incorporate the information about complexities of receiving values
when determine payment and change, we consider the difference between the com-
plexities of two receiving values in the same transaction as a feature and include this
variable in the upcoming model.
Multi-sending Transactions
Multi-sending transactions are those payment transactions in which there are two
or more sending addresses. In these transactions, the Bitcoins in the sending addresses
are pooled together to provide funding for the payment. Intuitively, a multi-sending
transaction should only occur when the payment value is relatively large and the
sending values in multiple sending addresses have to be combined in order to provide
sufficient funding. Thus, strictly speaking, in these multi-sending transactions, the
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payment value should be larger than the combined values of every combination of
the sending addresses except the one combination which includes all of the sending
addresses; and the change value, on the other hand, should be smaller than each of
the sending values, and consequently smaller than the payment value.
In practice, however, this is not always the case. Figure 2.42 gives a hexagon
binning version of the scatter plot of the payment value against the change value for
each transaction in the model building set, conditioning on the number of sending
addresses in this transaction. On the first page which corresponds to single-sending
transactions, the points are scattered on both sides of the y = x reference line and
no pattern stands out. On all other pages, which correspond to multi-sending trans-
actions, there are points on the top left side of the y = x reference line as well and
the payment values are not always greater than the change values. However, we
should note that the the payment values are generally more likely to be larger than
the change values in multi-sending transactions, especially as the number of sending
addresses increases.
Link to figure
Figure 2.42.: Payment value against change value in model building set of trans-
actions, conditioning on number of sending addresses.
Furthermore, we have observed that senders would sometimes include sending
addresses bringing various small amount of Bitcoins, such as 1 satoshi, into multi-
sending transactions, and we suspect that these senders are merging their (small)
funds while making a payment at the same time. Therefore, in order to take advantage
of the general properties of multi-sending transactions while taking into account these
unusual behaviors, we decide to loose the restriction by simply checking if a receiving
values is larger than each of the sending values. Another simple rule to determine
payment and change is to see if one of the receiving values is larger than each of the
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sending values and the other is not, and we would claim the former is the payment
and the later is the change.
In the model building set of transactions, there are a total of 3,415,525 multi-
sending transactions, and in 2,458,966 of them the above rule applies, i.e., one of the
receiving values is larger than all individual sending values while the other is not.
After applying the above rule, we have correctly identified the payment in 92.82% of
those 2,458,966 transactions.
Therefore, to make use of the information regarding the receiving values in multi-
sending transactions, we also include variables that indicate whether or not each
receiving value is larger than all individual sending values in the upcoming model.
Shadow Address
As introduced in [27] and further exploited in [28], there are addresses, referred to
as shadow addresses, that are automatically generated by the Bitcoin client programs
or the online wallet services to collect the change for the sender each time the sender
is making a payment.
The identification of shadow address would directly lead to the identification of
change address, however, the truth about which address is a shadow address is un-
known. Empirically, an informative guess can be made based on the properties of
these shadow addresses: because a new shadow address is generated every time there
is a change to be collected and the sender, or effectively the owner of the shadow
address, is usually not informed by the client program or online wallet services of this
address and thus is not aware of its existence, the sender is likely not going to use this
address to receive any Bitcoins again. Therefore, these shadow addresses are usually
used to receive once and will likely never be used to receive again.
Based on these properties, various definitions of shadow address have been pro-
posed in [27] and [28]. Similarly in this study, we define a shadow address to be
an address that satisfies the following conditions. It is important to note that these
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definitions are usually more aggressive than we would want them to be, because these
properties are shared by addresses other than shadow addresses. For example, a very
careful Bitcoin user would generate a new address for each receiving activity, and
these addresses would have been label as shadow address based on these definitions
as they are also used to receive only once, but not for collecting the change. Neverthe-
less, these aggressive definitions have proved to be useful in other studies and is also
useful in ours to determine payment and change, and we decide to take advantage of
them anyway.
• This address has conducted only one receiving activity.
• This address was not receiving in a generation transaction.
• This address was not the only receiving address.
• This address was not receiving in a same-address transaction.
• This address was not receiving multiple times in the same transaction.
• If there are more than one address satisfying the above conditions, none of them
are shadow addresses.
Through this definition, we have identified a total of 12,249,619 shadow addresses.
In a two-receiving transaction, if one of the two receiving addresses is a shadow address
and the other is not, then the shadow address is likely to be the change address and
the other address is like to be the payment address. In the model building set, there
are 1,485,994 transactions where this condition holds, and in 95% of them, the shadow
address is indeed receiving the change.
Thus, we include additional variables that indicate whether or not each receiving
address is a shadow address in the upcoming model.
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Static Receiving Address
As introduced in Section 2.5.5, static receiving addresses, such as the WikiLeaks
static address, are those addresses that have been used to receive Bitcoins from many
different entities in many receiving activities, and then those Bitcoins received are
often merged into larger pieces and are spent in following sending activities of those
addresses.
We believe that many of these static receiving addresses are the “face” addresses
of certain individuals or organizations, and they are used to receive payments, or
donations in cases similar to WikiLeaks, from various sender entities. Some of these
addresses are often publicly announced in some way, either on their websites or in
various online forums, and they remain static and active to conduct receiving activ-
ities because it is more convenient for different sender entities to make payments,
sometimes repeatedly, to the same address; other static receiving addresses are often
the “favorite” addresses of individual users, i.e., many users did not bother generat-
ing new addresses when they receive Bitcoins from others and kept using the same
addresses again and again for simplicity and their own convenience.
Loosely speaking, addresses hosting specific services, such as the 27 SatoshiDice
bet addresses and the bet addresses of other gambling services mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.5.3, are also static receiving addresses. These addresses are receiving Bitcoins
from many other sender entities, and they have to remain static so that they can con-
tinue to provide particular services, betting games in the case of SatoshiDice and other
gambling services, for its users. The only difference between these service addresses
and the “face” addresses mentioned above is how the received Bitcoins are spent:
while “face” addresses tend to merge small funds into larger pieces when spending,
the service addresses would behave in a more deterministic and systematic way as
they are programmed to do so, e.g., those bet addresses would react to each bet and
spend the received Bitcoins in the return transaction rather than merging funds.
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Naturally, these static receiving addresses are likely to be used to receive payments
instead of changes due to its particular functionalities.
In this study, we define a static receiving address as following:
• This address has no less than 10 receiving activities.
• This address has no less than 10 sending related activities, including sending
activities and self-sending activities.
• This address rarely conducts self-sending activities, more specifically less than
20% of sending related activities are self-sending activities
• When this address conducts self-sending activities, it is the only receiving ad-
dress in the transactions, i.e., this address is merging funds into itself rather
than collecting the change in its self-sending activities.
• At least 20% of the sender entities has sent to this address only once.
We have identified a total of 167,103 static receiving addresses by this definition.
In a two-receiving transaction, if one of the two receiving addresses is a static receiving
address and the other is not, then the static receiving address is likely to be the
payment address and the other is the change address. In the model building set,
there are 1,958,085 transactions where this condition holds, and in almost all of them,
99.78% to be exact, the static receiving address is receiving the payment.
Therefore, we include additional variables that indicate whether or not each re-
ceiving address is a static receiving address in the upcoming model.
2.6.3 The Classification Model
From the previous subsection, we have identified 4 features that characterize vari-
ous properties of payment and change in two-receiving transactions. In the model, we
decide to represent the features in the form of the following predictor variables describ-
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ing the two receiving values/addresses, as a trade-off between simplicity/efficiency of
storage and representability of the features.
complexity: The difference between the complexities of two receiving values in a
two-receiving transaction. The difference is calculated as the complexity of the
second receiving value subtracted by that of the first receiving value. This
variable takes integer values from −11 to 11.
multi.sending: Whether or not neither, either, or both of the two receiving values
satisfy the condition that the value is greater than each of the sending values in
a two-receiving transaction. This is a categorical variable and it is represented
as an integer value from 0 to 3, with 0 says neither of the two receiving values
satisfy the condition, 1 says the first one satisfies, 2 says the second one satisfies,
and 3 says both of the two satisfy. Notice that in a single-sending transaction,
neither of the two receiving values could be greater than the single sending value,
so this variable would take the value of 0, which is the same value this variable
would take when neither of the two receiving values are greater than each of
the sending values in multi-sending transactions. In both cases, the information
regarding the relative size of receiving values compared with sending values is
not going to be of much help in determining the payment and change anyway,
so we decide to merge these two cases into the same category of this variable,
instead of introducing an additional indicator variable for multi-sending/single-
sending transactions.
shadow: Whether or not neither, or either of the two receiving addresses is a shadow
address. This is also a categorical variable and it is represented as an integer
value from 0 to 2, with 0 says neither of the two receiving addresses are shadow
addresses, 1 says the first one is, and 2 says the second one is. Based on
our definition of shadow addresses, there is at most one shadow address in
a transaction, so it is impossible to have both receiving addresses as shadow
addresses.
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static: Whether or not neither, either, or both of the two receiving addresses is a
static receiving address. This is another categorical variable and it is represented
as an integer value from 0 to 3, with 0 says neither of the two receiving addresses
are static receiving addresses, 1 says the first one is, and 2 says the second one
is.
For each two-receiving transaction, the response variable y, or the class label,
takes one of two values, “Payment” and “Change”, depending on the status of the
first receiving address: y = Payment if the first receiving address is receiving the
payment, and y = Change if it is collecting the change.
With the help of the transaction based database described in Section 2.4.1, the
extraction of the model building set of two-receiving transactions from all the trans-
actions has become very easy to program and efficient to run, so are the computations
of predictor variables and response variables in those transactions. This is achieved in
a single MapReduce job and the database is scanned once. In this MapReduce job, we
computed the 4 predictor variables and the response variable for each transaction in
the model building set, and there are a total of 7,971,509 observations/transactions.
Now that the data are small enough, we could read them into memory and store them
in an R data frame of 7,971,509 rows and 5 columns for more interactive analysis and
modelling.
Notice that most of our predictor variables are categorical variables, we decide
to fit a classification tree [65] to the data using the R package “tree” [66]. The
classification tree model is built in the following steps.
First of all, we randomly split the 7,971,509 observations into two parts, one part
consists of 4,971,509 observations and serves as the training set in order to build and
validate the model, and the other part consists of 3,000,000 observations and serves
as the testing set in order to obtain a better estimate of the testing misclassification
error of the model.
Secondly, we fit a classification tree to the training set. A large tree is grown with
29 terminal nodes, and the training misclassification error rate is 0.04749. We apply
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the tree to the testing set and the testing misclassification error rate is 0.04740. The
results are very promising as the misclassification error rate is less than 5% in both
the training set and the testing set.
Next, we consider whether pruning the tree might lead to improved results. We
perform a 10-fold cross-validation in order to determine the optimal level of tree com-
plexity, and the smallest tree with the smallest cross-validation error rate is selected.
The selected tree has 9 terminal nodes, and it is fitted to the training set and then
applied to the testing set. The misclassification error rate is 0.05135 in the training
set and 0.05125 in the testing set. Compared with the above large tree, the misclas-
sification error rates has only increased slightly while the selected tree has become
much simpler.
Figure 2.43 displays the result of the selected tree. It consists of a series of splitting
rules, starting at the top of the tree. The splitting rules are based on the value of
predictor variables and all 4 predictor variables are being used in this tree. For
example, the top split assigns observations/transactions having variable shadow = 1,
i.e., the first receiving address as a shadow address, to the left branch and predict the
first receiving address as the change address. Observations having variable shadow
= 0 or 2, i.e., the second receiving address is a shadow address or neither of the
two are shadow addresses, are assigned to the right branch and further splitting are
performed based on other variables. There are a total of 9 terminal nodes in the tree,
corresponding to 9 different conditions under which the first receiving address in a
two-receiving transaction is predicted to be a change address or a payment address.
Link to figure
Figure 2.43.: Classification tree for identifying payment and change.
Finally, we want to note that the training error and testing error of the tree are
both fairly small (around 5%), suggesting the model is doing a decent job identifying
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payment and change; and also these two are close to each other, suggesting that there
is unlikely to be any over-fitting. Indeed, given the vast number of observations and
small number of features, over-fitting is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, this
provides opportunities to further improve the model, by introducing more and more
features. Potential features could be discovered from either within the transaction
history data as we have obtained, or from external data sources, including lower level
network information such as TCP/IP layer information, off-network information such
as voluntary disclosure of ownership of addresses, etc. With the additional features
added to the model building set of two-receiving transactions we have identified,
similar tree based models or other classification models could be readily built and
validated with the enhanced data similar to the analysis we have presented here.
Furthermore, while the classification model does not apply directly to three-or-more-
receiving transactions, these features we have identified are nonetheless informative to
identify the payment address(es) and change address(es) in those transactions. And
we will leave these as future work.
2.7 Conclusion
We have described our procedures for the collection and processing of the Bitcoin
transaction history data, and we have designed and constructed various databases of
transaction level and address level information that enable efficient individual ran-
dom queries and entire database scans, and facilitate comprehensive analysis of Bit-
coin transactions and Bitcoin addresses. The transaction based database consists
of information per transaction basis, and various properties of the transactions are
analyzed while extensively utilizing the database. The address based databases con-
sist of summarized or detailed information per address basis, and powered by these
databases, we have performed an analysis of overall properties of all addresses, as
well as the construction and analysis of the profiles of a few representative groups
of addresses. Furthermore, we have proposed and validated a classification model
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for the identification of payment and change in Bitcoin transactions: the model it-
self effectively identifies payment and change in two-receiving transactions, and along
with the model building set of transactions we have identified and the features char-
acterizing the properties of payment and change we have proposed, they provide a
framework for building and validating similar models to identify payment and change
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